本集介紹
2021.10.09 國際新聞導讀-阿富汗清真寺被伊斯蘭國攻擊，有70-80人死亡塔利班持續進繳IS-K、土耳其與俄羅斯持續接近對以色列造成威脅、耶路撒冷聖殿山爭議法官裁定猶太人可在聖殿山上安靜地禱告但穆斯林反對
自殺式炸彈襲擊者在阿富汗清真寺襲擊中喪生
伊斯蘭國聲稱對導致數十人死亡、更多人受傷的自殺式爆炸事件負責。
星期五，一名自殺式炸彈襲擊者襲擊了阿富汗東北部昆都士省的一座清真寺，在該國本週第三次襲擊宗教機構的事件中殺死了數十名信徒。
伊斯蘭國聲稱對國營巴赫塔爾通訊社稱的襲擊負責，該襲擊造成 46 人死亡，143 人受傷。 兩名衛生官員告訴路透社，死亡人數可能在 70 至 80 人之間。
視頻片段顯示，清真寺內被碎片包圍的屍體被少數什葉派穆斯林社區的人們使用。
聯合國駐阿富汗代表團稱這是令人不安的暴力模式的一部分，最近幾天在喀布爾的一座清真寺和東部霍斯特省的一所宗教學校發生爆炸。
最近幾週發生了類似的襲擊事件，其中一些也被伊斯蘭國聲稱擁有，其戰士是遜尼派穆斯林。
2021 年 10 月 3 日，阿富汗喀布爾，塔利班部隊成員乘坐裝有武器的皮卡車。（圖片來源：REUTERS/JORGE SILVA）
這些襲擊凸顯了塔利班面臨的安全挑戰，塔利班於 8 月接管了該國，此後一直對喀布爾的伊斯蘭國組織開展行動。
塔利班發言人扎比胡拉·穆賈希德在推特上說：“今天下午，我們什葉派同胞的一座清真寺發生了爆炸……我們的一些同胞因此喪生和受傷。”
Suicide bomber kills scores in Afghan mosque attack
Islamic State has claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing that left dozens dead, even more wounded.
By REUTERS
OCTOBER 8, 2021 19:24
Afghan men walk at a mosque in Herat, Afghanistan September 10, 2021.
(photo credit: VIA REUTERS)
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A suicide bomber attacked a mosque in Afghanistan's northeastern Kunduz province on Friday, killing scores of worshippers in the country's third attack this week on a religious institution.
Islamic State claimed responsibility for an attack that state-run Bakhtar news agency said had killed 46 people and wounded 143. Two health officials told Reuters the death toll could be between 70 and 80.
Video footage showed bodies surrounded by debris inside the mosque that is used by people from the minority Shi'ite Muslim community.
The blast, which the United Nations' mission in Afghanistan called part of a disturbing pattern of violence, follows others in recent days at a mosque in Kabul and a religious school in the eastern province of Khost.
There have been similar attacks in recent weeks, some of which have also been claimed by Islamic State, whose fighters are Sunni Muslims.
Members of Taliban forces ride on a pick-up truck mounted with a weapon in Kabul, Afghanistan, October 3, 2021. (credit: REUTERS/JORGE SILVA)
The attacks underscore security challenges facing the Taliban, which took over the country in August and have since carried out operations against Islamic State cells in Kabul.
"This afternoon, an explosion took place in a mosque of our Shiite compatriots … as a result of which a number of our compatriots were martyred and wounded," Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said on Twitter.
州上訴裁決允許猶太人在聖殿山安靜祈禱
該州對一項裁決提出上訴，該裁決暗示支持在聖殿山上安靜的猶太人祈禱，因為巴勒斯坦人威脅要使用暴力。
通過TZVI JOFFRE
2021 年 10 月 8 日 16:24
週日，在 Tisha Be'av 期間，安全部隊保護前往聖殿山的猶太遊客的安全
（照片來源：AMMAR AWAD / 路透社）
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公安部長奧馬爾·巴列夫週五警告說，暗示支持在聖殿山上安靜的猶太人祈禱的法院裁決將“危及公共和平並可能導致爆發”，因為巴勒斯坦人警告說不要改變聖殿山的現狀。地點。
週三，耶路撒冷地方法院審理了 Aryeh Lipo 的上訴，他是聖殿山的一名猶太遊客，在一名警察命令他在贖罪日訪問期間停止祈禱後，他已被移走並遠離建築群 15 天。
Bilha Yahalom法官在觀看了事件的錄音後裁定，上訴人的行為沒有違反聖殿山上的法律或警察的指示，因為他是在沒有人群的情況下安靜地以一種不可見或不可見的方式祈禱。該裁決還指出，以色列警方對 Lipo 和許多其他人一樣，每天都在聖殿山祈禱沒有異議。
儘管警方提出了相反的說法，但法官還駁回了 Lipo 以安靜的祈禱構成任何危險或犯下任何違法行為的觀點。
雖然高等法院過去曾裁定猶太人確實有在聖殿山上祈禱的合法權利，但警方以安全考慮為由全面禁止猶太人祈禱。
該網站的猶太遊客在進入時會被告知祈禱和宗教物品，如祈禱書或祈禱披肩，或禁止進入該建築群，儘管自 2019 年底以來，猶太遊客已經能夠在該網站的某些部分安靜地祈禱不受干擾。
Bar Lev 週五宣布，以色列警方將對裁決提出上訴，因為“現狀的改變將危及公共和平，並可能導致爆發。”
“以色列國主張所有人的崇拜和祈禱自由，但是，鑑於安全影響，必須維持現狀，即聖殿山上的猶太人祈禱將在西牆附近進行，而穆斯林將在 al-Haram al-Sharif 舉行，”Bar Lev 說。
巴勒斯坦人周五呼籲在阿克薩清真寺進行“普遍動員”，以回應法院的裁決，公告顯示有人在扔石頭。
巴勒斯坦媒體週五還聲稱，以色列安全部隊阻止一些禮拜者前往阿克薩清真寺進行黎明和中午的祈禱。報導稱，儘管有限制，但仍有 50,000 名信徒參加了清真寺的祈禱。
據以色列警方稱，375 名在以色列非法滯留的巴勒斯坦人以及 5 名駕駛非法外國人的巴士司機於週五在前往耶路撒冷的途中被警方逮捕。所有非法外國人都被送回西岸。
據報導，黎明時分的信徒高呼“我們將用我們的鮮血和靈魂來救贖你，阿克薩”，這是在聖殿山周圍的緊張局勢中經常使用的口號。
週四，哈馬斯運動稱該裁決是“明確的宣戰”和“對神聖的阿克薩清真寺的公然侵略”。
“耶路撒冷之劍之戰不是，也不會是耶路撒冷名義下對抗的最後一章，承諾和實現的抵抗證實，它已準備好並準備好擊退侵略和捍衛權利，”警告說。哈馬斯。
星期五也是自 1990 年聖殿山騷亂以來的 31 週年，在這場騷亂中，大約 20 名巴勒斯坦人在住棚節假期期間在聖殿山發生的暴力騷亂中喪生，19 名警察、一些西牆崇拜者和 100 多名巴勒斯坦人受傷。
State appeals ruling allowing quiet Jewish prayer on Temple Mount
The state appealed a ruling which implied support for quiet Jewish prayer on the Temple Mount as Palestinians threatened violence.
By TZVI JOFFRE
OCTOBER 8, 2021 16:24
SECURITY FORCES guard the safety of Jewish visitors to the Temple Mount during Tisha Be’av, on Sunday
(photo credit: AMMAR AWAD / REUTERS)
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Public Security Minister Omer Bar Lev warned on Friday that the court ruling implying support for quiet Jewish prayer on the Temple Mount would "endanger the public peace and could cause a flare-up," as Palestinians warned against a change in the status quo at the site.
On Wednesday, the Jerusalem Magistrate’s Court heard the appeal of Aryeh Lipo, a Jewish visitor to the Temple Mount who had been removed and distanced from the complex for 15 days after a police officer ordered him to stop praying during a visit on Yom Kippur.
After watching a recording of the incident, Justice Bilha Yahalom ruled that the appellant’s behavior did not violate the law or police instructions on the Temple Mount, as he was praying without a crowd and quietly in a way that was not external or visible. The ruling stated as well that Israel Police did not dispute that Lipo, like many others, prays on a daily basis on the Temple Mount.
The justice additionally dismissed the notion that Lipo posed any danger or committed any violation with his quiet prayer, despite claims by police to the contrary.
While the High Court of Justice has ruled in the past that Jews do have the legal right to pray on the Temple Mount, police have cited security concerns to impose a blanket prohibition on Jewish prayer.
Jewish visitors to the site are informed upon entry that prayer and religious items such as prayer books or prayer shawls or forbidden in the complex, although, since late 2019, Jewish visitors have been able to pray quietly, in certain parts of the site, relatively undisturbed.
Bar Lev announced on Friday that Israel Police would appeal the ruling because "a change in the status quo will endanger the public peace and could cause a flare-up."
"The State of Israel advocates freedom of worship and prayer for all, however, in view of the security implications, the status quo must be upheld that the prayer of Jews on the Temple Mount will take place next to the Western Wall and the prayer of Muslims will take place in al-Haram al-Sharif," said Bar Lev.
Palestinians called for a "general mobilization" at al-Aqsa Mosque on Friday in response to the court ruling, with the announcement showing figures throwing stones.
Palestinian media additionally claimed on Friday that Israeli security forces prevented some worshipers from reaching the al-Aqsa Mosque for dawn and noon prayers. The reports claimed that despite the restrictions, 50,000 worshippers attended prayers at the mosque.
375 Palestinians illegally in Israel, as well as five bus drivers who drove illegal aliens, were arrested by police on their way to Jerusalem on Friday, according to Israel Police. All the illegal aliens were returned to the West Bank.
The worshipers at dawn reportedly chanted "With our blood and souls we will redeem you, al-Aqsa," a chant often used amid tensions surrounding the Temple Mount.
On Thursday, the Hamas movement called the ruling a “clear declaration of war” and a “blatant aggression against the blessed al-Aqsa Mosque” on Thursday.
“The battle of the sword of Jerusalem was not and will not be the last chapter of the confrontation under the title of Jerusalem, and the resistance that was promised and fulfilled confirms that it is ready and prepared to repel aggression and defend rights,” warned Hamas.
Friday also marks 31 years since the 1990 Temple Mount riots, in which about 20 Palestinians were killed and 19 policemen, a number of Western Wall worshippers and over 100 Palestinians were injured in violent riots on the Temple Mount during the Sukkot holiday.
土耳其與俄羅斯之間日益增長的關係令以色列感到擔憂-意見
由於安卡拉進行外聯活動以避免外交孤立，耶路撒冷可能會保持警惕。
作者：喬納森·斯派爾
2021 年 10 月 7 日 21:00
鴿子在布爾薩的土耳其總統雷傑普·塔伊普·埃爾多安的大海報前飛翔。
（照片來源：GORAN TOMASEVIC/REUTERS）
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上週在索契與俄羅斯總統弗拉基米爾·普京會晤時，土耳其總統雷傑普·塔伊普·埃爾多安重申了莫斯科和安卡拉之間日益密切的聯繫。索契會談是在埃爾多安未能在紐約聯合國大會邊緣與美國總統喬拜登會面之後舉行的。埃爾多安在與普京會晤後對記者說，他曾提議土耳其與俄羅斯合作，在土耳其領土上再建設兩座核電站。俄羅斯公司 Rosatom 目前正在土耳其南部的阿庫尤建造一座發電廠。
土耳其總統上週還表示，土耳其仍打算從俄羅斯購買第二批 S-400 導彈防禦系統。土耳其去年購買該系統導緻美國對土耳其國防工業局實施制裁，並取消了土耳其對 F-35 戰鬥機的接收。
路透社援引土耳其總統的話說，土耳其總統在接受哥倫比亞廣播公司網絡採訪時說：“未來，沒有人能夠干涉我們從哪個國家、在什麼級別獲得什麼樣的防禦系統。”
來自 Jpost 的最新文章
美國國務院在回應埃爾多安的聲明時警告說，任何額外購買俄羅斯防禦系統的行為都可能引發額外制裁。
土耳其總統雷傑普·塔伊普·埃爾多安 (Recep Tayyip Erdogan) 和時任美國副總統喬·拜登 (Joe Biden) 於 2016 年在伊斯坦布爾會面後聊天。 （圖片來源：REUTERS）
埃爾多安的聲明證實了土耳其對俄羅斯的傾斜，以及安卡拉與華盛頓日益疏遠。
土耳其最近的舉動也反映了土耳其地區戰略核心的矛盾，即避免孤立的直接願望與單邊地區主張和支持遜尼派政治伊斯蘭教的更深層次戰略目標之間的矛盾，這是埃爾多安核心觀點的一部分，以及他身邊。對這一矛盾的理解很可能決定以色列對土耳其外交舉措的反應。
土耳其對俄羅斯的舉動不僅取決於安卡拉與華盛頓關係的惡化。土耳其對法國與土耳其的傳統競爭對手希臘最近達成的一項重大海軍防禦協議感到憤怒和擔憂。希臘承諾從法國購買三艘 Belharra 護衛艦和三艘 Gowind 護衛艦，價值 50 億美元的交易將有助於大幅提升希臘在東地中海和愛琴海的防禦能力，而此時兩國之間關係緊張。圍繞這些領域的爭端越來越多。
法國-希臘海軍協議是在去年達成的一項協議之後達成的，其中雅典承諾以 25 億美元的價格購買 18 架第四代陣風戰鬥機。再加上法國對土耳其在東地中海採取的強硬立場，這些重大國防交易鞏固了法國和希臘之間的戰略聯盟。法國現在承諾，如果需要，將向希臘提供軍事援助。
由於雅典和安卡拉之間在愛琴海的海空權以及東地中海的鑽探權方面存在重大爭議，不難看出為什麼事態的方向讓土耳其不安，也不難看出為什麼埃爾多安正在尋找新的合作夥伴。美國正在該地區進行全面縮編。希臘一直積極努力確保華盛頓在與俄羅斯的任何緊急戰略競爭中堅定地支持美國。美國對土耳其購買俄羅斯軍事裝備和侵犯人權以及其他美國聯盟的憤怒使華盛頓無法成為土耳其地區野心的合作夥伴。
然而，土耳其並不能簡單地用華盛頓的讚助來換取莫斯科的讚助。在一些關鍵的地區文件中，安卡拉和莫斯科也處於對立面。在利比亞，土耳其支持以的黎波里為基地的穆斯林兄弟會民族團結政府。在敘利亞，至關重要的是，土耳其承擔了該國西北部遜尼派伊斯蘭控制的剩餘地區。與此同時，莫斯科支持利比亞東部的哈利法哈夫塔爾將軍在托布魯克的權威。莫斯科還致力於讓阿薩德政權恢復對整個敘利亞的主權。最近幾週，儘管土俄外交取得進展，但該政權和俄羅斯人對土耳其飛地的砲擊和空襲急劇增加。
因此，為了應對其潛在的孤立，土耳其正在尋求與近年來疏遠的一些其他地區參與者建立和解。土耳其正在努力向阿拉伯聯合酋長國、埃及，特別是以色列進行外交外聯。
埃及和土耳其官員之間的第二輪會談於 9 月在安卡拉舉行。土耳其於 2013 年從開羅撤回其大使，對當年在埃及推翻穆斯林兄弟會權力的軍事政變感到憤怒。關於阿聯酋，埃爾多安上個月與王儲謝赫·穆罕默德·本·扎耶德通了電話。
關於以色列，艾薩克·赫爾佐格總統在 7 月與埃爾多安進行了多次交談。自從這次電話會議以來，幾乎沒有出現任何實質內容。但是，當與更深層次的事件背道而馳時，以色列將需要仔細考慮與土耳其的任何可能短暫的和解的智慧和好處。不僅在以色列與希臘、埃及、阿拉伯聯合酋長國和法國發展戰略關係方面也是如此，這些國家已經並可能繼續採取堅決反對土耳其在東地中海野心的立場。
隨著土耳其繼續與冷戰聯盟脫鉤，以色列很可能希望考慮安卡拉對約旦河以西事件的持續立場。
以色列安全機構認為伊朗及其野心是對以色列安全的主要威脅。然而，以色列面臨的另一個關鍵長期戰略挑戰是約旦以西的猶太人和阿拉伯穆斯林人口幾乎持平。以色列在這方面享有的主要優勢是其先進的經濟和公民社會、統一的國家結構以及將阿拉伯人口分為四個不同的政治分配（哈馬斯控制的加沙、拉馬拉巴勒斯坦權力機構、耶路撒冷和 1948以色列）。保持這種分裂是以色列的一項重要利益。
在中長期維持這種局面的唯一嚴峻挑戰是遜尼派伊斯蘭教的動員象徵，以及尋求政治利用這些象徵的組織。土耳其在很大程度上處於雷達屏幕之下，近年來一直積極參與尋求在該領域獲得優勢。通過 TIKA（土耳其合作與協調局）的“Dawa”（福利宗教活動），在耶路撒冷和以色列其他地方購買財產和支持伊斯蘭激進主義，通過向哈馬斯控制的加沙提供財政捐助，以及通過定居和授予公民身份作為土耳其領土上的哈馬斯特工，安卡拉試圖將自己塑造成伊斯蘭聖地的保護者，以及與以色列長期鬥爭的讚助人。
目前，幾乎沒有跡象表明這種努力會產生重大成果。但只要與穆斯林兄弟會相關的 AKP 和埃爾多安在土耳其繼續掌權，這種情況就會持續下去。安卡拉在這一領域的持續努力、與華盛頓的日益疏遠、對俄羅斯的舉動以及對以色列最親密和新興的地區盟友的直接反對意味著土耳其和以色列之間不太可能即將和解，而為此過度努力是徒勞的，而且可能是不可取的，在可預見的未來。
Growing relations between Turkey, Russia is concern for Israel - opinion
As Ankara engages in outreach to avoid diplomatic isolation, Jerusalem is likely to be wary.
By JONATHAN SPYER
OCTOBER 7, 2021 21:00
PIGEONS FLY in front of a large poster of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Bursa.
(photo credit: GORAN TOMASEVIC/REUTERS)
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At a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi last week, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reaffirmed the growing links between Moscow and Ankara. The Sochi talks came after Erdogan failed to secure a meeting with US President Joe Biden on the fringes of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. Speaking to reporters after the meeting with Putin, Erdogan noted that he had proposed that Turkey work together with Russia on the construction of two more nuclear power plants on Turkish soil. The Russian company Rosatom is currently building a power plant in Akkuyu, in southern Turkey.
The Turkish president also said last week that Turkey still intends to purchase a second supply of the S-400 missile defense system from Russia. The purchase of the system by Turkey last year led to US sanctions on Turkey’s Defense Industry Directorate, and the cancellation of Turkish reception of the F-35 fighter jet.
In an interview with the CBS network, quoted by Reuters, the Turkish president said that “In the future, nobody will be able to interfere in terms of what kind of defense systems we acquire, from which country and at what level.”
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The US State Department, responding to Erdogan’s statement, warned that any additional purchase of Russian defense systems would risk triggering additional sanctions.
TURKISH PRESIDENT Recep Tayyip Erdogan and then-US vice president Joe Biden chat after their meeting in Istanbul in 2016. (credit: REUTERS)
Erdogan’s statements confirm the Turkish tilt toward Russia, and Ankara’s growing estrangement from Washington.
The latest Turkish moves also reflect a contradiction at the heart of Turkish regional strategy, between an immediate desire to avoid isolation, and the deeper strategic goal of unilateral regional assertion and support for Sunni political Islam which are part of the core outlook of Erdogan and those around him. The understanding of this contradiction is likely to determine Israeli responses to Turkish diplomatic moves.
The Turkish move toward Russia is not only determined by Ankara’s declining relations with Washington. There is anger and concern in Turkey regarding a recent major naval defense deal between France and Turkey’s traditional rivals, Greece. The $5 billion deal, according to which Greece commits to the purchase of three Belharra frigates and three Gowind corvettes from France, will serve to sharply advance Greek defense capabilities in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea, at a time when tensions between the two countries over disputes in these areas are increasing.
The French-Greek naval deal follows an agreement last year in which Athens committed to the purchase of 18 fourth generation Rafale fighter jets, for $2.5 billion. Taken together with the assertive French stance against Turkish moves in the Eastern Mediterranean, these major defense deals cement a strategic alliance between France and Greece. France is now committed to come to Greece’s military aid if requested.
With major disputes extant between Athens and Ankara over air and sea rights in the Aegean, and drilling rights in the Eastern Mediterranean, it is not hard to see why the direction of events has Turkey rattled, nor why Erdogan is looking around for new partners. The US is engaged in a general drawdown in the region. Greece has been active in efforts to ensure Washington of its firm pro-US alignment in any emergent strategic competition with Russia. US anger over the Turkish purchase of Russian military equipment and over human rights violations, along with other US alliances, make Washington unavailable as a partner for Turkey’s regional ambitions.
Turkey, however, is not in a position simply to exchange Washington’s patronage for Moscow’s. On a number of key regional files, Ankara and Moscow too are on opposite sides. In Libya, Turkey supports the Tripoli-based, Muslim Brotherhood associated Government of National Accord. In Syria, crucially, Turkey underwrites a remaining area of Sunni Islamist control in the northwest of the country. Moscow, meanwhile, backs the Tobruk-based authority of General Khalifa Haftar in eastern Libya. Moscow is also committed to the Assad regime’s recovery of sovereignty over the whole of Syria. Shelling and air attacks by the regime and the Russians on the Turkish enclave have increased sharply in recent weeks, even as Turkish-Russian diplomacy advances.
TO COUNTER its potential isolation, Turkey is therefore seeking rapprochement with a number of additional regional players from which it became estranged in recent years. Efforts at Turkish diplomatic outreach are under way toward the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and, notably, Israel.
A second round of talks between Egyptian and Turkish officials took place in Ankara in September. Turkey withdrew its ambassador from Cairo in 2013, furious at the military coup that removed the Muslim Brotherhood from power in Egypt that year. Regarding the UAE, Erdogan spoke by telephone with Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed Bin Zayed last month.
Regarding Israel, President Isaac Herzog to much media fanfare spoke with Erdogan in July. Little of substance has emerged since this call. But Israel will need to consider carefully the wisdom and benefit of any possibly short-lived rapprochement with Turkey, when set against the deeper direction of events. This is so not only with regard to Israel’s developing strategic ties with Greece, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and France, countries which have taken and are likely to continue to take a continued stance of firm opposition to Turkish ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean.
As Turkey continues its path of decoupling from its Cold War set of alliances, Israel may well wish to consider Ankara’s ongoing stance concerning events west of the Jordan River.
The Israeli security establishment considers Iran and its ambitions to represent the main threat to Israel’s security. An additional key long-term strategic challenge facing Israel, however, is the near parity of populations between Jews and Arab Muslims west of the Jordan. The main advantages Israel enjoys in this regard are its advanced economy and civil society, its unified state structures, and the division of the Arab population into four different political dispensations (Hamas-controlled Gaza, the Ramallah Palestinian Authority, Jerusalem, and pre-1948 Israel). Maintaining this division is a vital Israeli interest.
The only serious challenge to the maintenance of this situation in the medium to long term is the mobilizing symbols of Sunni Islam, and organizations seeking to make political use of these. Turkey, largely below the radar screen, has been energetically engaged in recent years in seeking to gain advantage in this area. Through “Dawa” (welfare-religious activities) via TIKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), property purchases and support for Islamist activism in Jerusalem and elsewhere in Israel, through financial contributions to Hamas-controlled Gaza, and through domiciling and granting citizenship to Hamas operatives on Turkish soil, Ankara seeks to cast itself as the protector of Islamic holy places, and the patron of the long struggle against Israel.
There are few indications of this effort bearing significant results at the present time. But it looks set to continue for as long as the Muslim Brotherhood-associated AKP and Erdogan remain in power in Turkey. Ankara’s ongoing efforts in this area, its increasing estrangement from Washington, its moves toward Russia and its direct opposition to Israel’s closest and emergent regional allies mean that imminent rapprochement between Turkey and Israel is unlikely, and excessive effort toward it is futile and probably inadvisable, for the foreseeable future.
記錄 ISIS 在伊拉克的罪行——書評
從斬首婦女到將同性戀者從屋頂上趕下，再到伊朗的擴張，ISIS 的罪行範圍難以把握，但衝突記者 Hollie S. McKay 的新書堪稱記錄。
通過BENJAMIN WEINTHAL
2021 年 10 月 7 日 21:17
2015 年，伊拉克什葉派準軍事組織向費盧杰北部的伊斯蘭國特工發射火箭。
（圖片來源：STRINGER/REUTERS）
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衝突記者霍莉·麥凱 (Hollie S. McKay) 提交了大量非常詳細的阿富汗地面報導，美國武裝部隊於 8 月下旬在阿富汗完成了撤退。
她在 9 月 16 日為紐約郵報發出的題為“塔利班接管一個月後喀布爾的轉變”捕捉到了阿富汗人在首都的悲慘困境和女性不祥的安全氛圍。
在談到管理這座城市的塔利班恐怖分子時，她評論道：“大多數人不會與我進行眼神交流或承認我是一個女人——但偶爾，你會發現一個看起來像死人一樣的人。”
麥凱是一位無所畏懼的戰地記者，她為福克斯新聞穿越了衝突地區，我開始閱讀她的故事。多年來，我一直是麥凱的忠實讀者，因為她的作品充滿了人性，並試圖闡明普通人在戰區的鬥爭。
澳大利亞出生的麥凱於 2007 年開始擔任福克斯新聞數字記者，深入研究伊拉克、敘利亞、也門和阿富汗的戰區。
她的新書《為生而哭泣：來自 ISIS 戰場內部的備忘錄》反映了這位資深記者的廣闊視野，表達了對中東伊斯蘭中心地帶的無限好奇。
對於以色列人、散居海外的猶太人和其他許多人來說，麥凱關於她在庫爾德斯坦的第一次安息日晚宴的快訊提供了對庫爾德-以色列和庫爾德-猶太關係的迷人見解。2016 年 10 月，她在題為“猶太人走出隱匿處”的章節中寫道，“‘猶太人會驚訝地發現，他們在這裡比在某些歐洲首都更自由、更安全，’猶太政府代表 Sherzad Omer Mamsani 堅持說。 ”
她指出，“仍然沒有猶太教堂或供猶太人祈禱和聚會的公共場所。一些 KRG 官員表示，他們正試圖在該地區開設寺廟，但其他人則聲稱，與巴格達的關係惡化，以及對伊朗資助的民兵組織和持續的聖戰威脅的擔憂阻礙了這種努力。”
麥凱的書涉及伊斯蘭國的興衰。她在 2016 年 7 月關於“釋放費盧杰”的章節殘酷地提醒了伊斯蘭國運動的意識形態：“不同的說法證明了瀰漫在這座城市的不信任和恐懼。在伊斯蘭國的控制下，週五早上的祈禱之後是公共廣場的大規模處決。有時人們被關在籠子裡，裡面關著貪婪的野生動物；有時他們被炸毀了。有時他們被縱火，有時他們被裝甲車碾過。”
她寫道：“就像在 ISIS 龐大的哈里發國的其他地方一樣，涉嫌通奸的女性被斬首，而被認為是同性戀的男性則被從建築物頂上拋下。在 [解放費盧杰] 的最後一戰前幾週，我了解到 10 名男孩因逃離 ISIS 訓練營而被殺的故事。這些胡說八道既沒有意義，也沒有公平。”
只為 ISIS 戰場內的活備忘錄而哭泣 作者：Hollie S. McKay（圖片來源：對方提供）
與伊斯蘭共和國結盟的民兵在人民動員部隊的保護傘下的作用，在麥凱的報告中脫穎而出：“不滿情緒上升，指責伊朗支持的 PMF 團體對占主導地位的遜尼派人口實施大規模侵犯人權行為。。”
麥凱的書涵蓋了 2014 年至 2018 年期間，並附有關於伊斯蘭國在 2019 年失去領土控制權的結語。
她在介紹中說：“在ISIS佔領的這些年裡，作為作家，我無數次進出伊拉克去調查這場襲擊。隨著時間的推移，解放這個四面楚歌的國家的鬥爭愈演愈烈，我在該地區度過的時間越來越多，決心盡我所能，通過倖存下來的普通人的鏡頭，描繪出歷史的粗略草稿。隨著歲月流逝，戰鬥愈演愈烈，我寫了越來越多的備忘錄，這本書就是例證。”
這本書充滿了關於中東人在血腥戰爭中的生活的感人且令人眼花繚亂的軼事。
在 2018 年 5 月發布的《伊朗的目標是成為山丘之王》中，她寫道：“雖然這種危險已經被踐踏，但一種新的雜草可能會蔓延到他們寶貴的包裹中。正如基督徒擔心德黑蘭擴張的手臂一樣，雅茲迪人也表示擔心伊朗建立一個關鍵的戰略立足點，這可能會使該地區的大部分地區——遠至以色列——成為攻擊的目標。”
麥凱寫道，伊拉克西北部 4,800 英尺高的辛賈爾山（Sinjar Mountain）以“一座供奉雅茲迪聖人沙夫丁（Sharfuddin）的小型粉筆白色寺廟為特色——掩蓋了其潛在的戰略重要性”。
“這一點是伊朗可以造成傷害的最接近以色列的點。埃爾比勒的分析師阿卜杜拉扎克·阿里告訴麥凱，並補充說，“真主黨也有可能從敘利亞進入並到達這個位置。 。”
麥凱指出，“伊拉克前獨裁者薩達姆侯賽因並沒有忽視這個地點的重要性。據說他曾將這座山用作他在 1991 年海灣戰爭期間向以色列發射的 39 枚飛毛腿導彈的發射場。 坐落在雅茲迪神廟旁邊，有一個結構，其特點是一塊六英尺寬的混凝土台階板似乎導致 30 英尺高到無處可去。一些當地人認為，正是從那裡，薩達姆發射了他的飛毛腿。”
戰地記者關於伊斯蘭共和國將辛賈爾用作什葉派走廊的一部分的報導講述了德黑蘭的帝國主義計劃。
“然而，在山下，道路和城鎮被伊朗影響或完全控制的各種民兵控制。軍事分析人士擔心，憑藉這種影響，伊朗有能力為其敵人製造麻煩，遠遠超出侯賽因的企圖，”她寫道。
McKay 繼續引用我的民主基金會同事和伊朗導彈專家 Behnam Ben Taleblu 的話，他說：“伊朗目前的武器庫比薩達姆的武器庫更加多樣化和更有能力。伊朗的導彈既可以作為威懾工具，也可以作為脅迫工具。”
任何希望了解伊斯蘭國的出現及其在 2014 年至 2018 年期間對中東人身心造成的悲慘影響的人都必須閱讀麥凱的書。
Only Cry for the Living 是新聞業和文學風格的最高成就。
作者是捍衛民主基金會的研究員。
Recording ISIS’s Iraqi crimes - book review
From beheading women to tossing homosexuals off roofs to Iranian expansion, the scope of ISIS's crimes is difficult to grasp, but conflict reporter Hollie S. McKay's new book acts as a record.
By BENJAMIN WEINTHAL
OCTOBER 7, 2021 21:17
IRAQI SHI’ITE paramilitaries launch a rocket towards Islamic State operatives, north of Fallujah, 2015.
(photo credit: STRINGER/ REUTERS)
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The conflict reporter Hollie S. McKay has filed a spectacular number of highly detailed reports from the ground in Afghanistan, where American armed forces completed their withdrawal in late August.
Her September 16 dispatch for the New York Post titled “The transformation of Kabul, one month after the Taliban takeover” captures the dire plight of Afghans in the capital and the ominous security climate for women.
Discussing the Taliban terrorists running the city, she comments, “Most won’t make eye contact or acknowledge me – as a woman – but occasionally, you will find one who looks me dead in the face.”
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McKay, a fearless war correspondent, has crisscrossed conflict areas for Fox News, where I started to read her stories. I have been a dedicated reader of McKay for years because her work spills over with humanity and seeks to illuminate the struggles of ordinary people in battle zones.
The Australian-born McKay commenced work as a Fox News Digital reporter in 2007, delving deep into the war zones of Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan.
Her new book, Only Cry for the Living: Memos From Inside the ISIS Battlefield, reflects the great breadth of the veteran journalist’s vision, which articulates a limitless curiosity about the Islamic heartland in the Mideast.
For Israelis, Jews in the Diaspora and many others, McKay’s dispatch about her first Shabbat dinner in Kurdistan offers fascinating insights into Kurdish-Israeli and Kurdish-Jewish relations. In her chapter titled “Jews Come out of Hiding” from October 2016, she writes, “‘Jews would be surprised to find that they are freer and safer here than in certain European capitals,’ insisted Sherzad Omer Mamsani, a Jewish government representative.”
She notes, “There were still no synagogues or public places for Jewish prayer and gathering. Some KRG officials said that they were trying to open temples in the region, but others claimed that such efforts were hindered by sour relations with Baghdad, along with concerns over Iranian-funded militias and the ongoing jihadist threat.”
McKay’s book deals with the rise and fall of the Islamic State. Her chapter on “Freed Fallujah” from July 2016 is a brutal reminder of the ideology that animated the Islamic State movement: “Differing accounts were a testament to the mistrust and fear that pervaded the city. Under ISIS control, Friday morning prayers were followed by mass executions in the public square. Sometimes people were locked in cages with ravenous wild animals; sometimes they were blown up. Sometimes they were set on fire and other times they were driven over by armored vehicles.”
She writes, “As in other parts of ISIS’s sprawling caliphate, women suspected of adultery were beheaded and men believed to be homosexual were thrown from atop buildings. In the weeks before the final battle [to liberate Fallujah], I learned the story of 10 young boys who were killed for fleeing ISIS training camps. There was no sense, nor fairness, in any of this nonsense.”
ONLY CRY FOR THE LIVING MEMOS FROM INSIDE THE ISIS BATTLEFIELD By Hollie S. McKay (credit: Courtesy)
The role of Islamic Republic-allied militias, under the umbrella of the Popular Mobilization Forces, comes to the fore in McKay’s reporting: “Grievances rose to accuse the Iran-backed mishmash of PMF groups of committing vast human rights abuse against the predominantly Sunni population.”
McKay’s book covers the period 2014-2018, with an epilogue about the Islamic State’s loss of territorial control in 2019.
She says in her introduction, “Throughout the years of ISIS occupation, I made countless trips in and out of Iraq to investigate the onslaught as a writer. As time went on and the fight to free the embattled nation intensified, I spent more and more time in the region, determined to play whatever small role I could to deliver a rough draft of history through the lens of the ordinary people surviving it. As the years went forth and the battle intensified, I wrote more and more memos as exemplified in this collection.”
The book is packed full of moving and dazzling anecdotes about the lives of Middle Easterners in the midst of blood-soaked war.
In her dispatch “Iran Aims to Be King of the Hill” from May 2018, she writes, “Although that danger had been trampled, a new weed threatened to extend into their precious parcel. Just as the Christians worried about the extended arm of Tehran, the Yazidis also expressed fear about Iran establishing a critical strategic foothold that could leave much of the region – reaching as far as Israel – in the crosshairs of an attack.”
The 4,800-foot Sinjar Mountain in northwestern Iraq, which featured “a small, chalk-white temple dedicated to Sharfuddin, a holy Yazidi figure – belied its potential strategic importance,” wrote McKay.
“This point is the closest point to Israel in which Iran can do harm. And the view is clear, the plain is wide, there are no mountains in the way,” Abdulrazaq Ali, an Erbil-based analyst, told McKay, adding, “It is also possible for Hezbollah to enter from Syria and get to this position.”
McKay notes, “The importance of the spot didn’t go unnoticed by former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. He was said to have used the mountain as the launch site for the 39 Scud missiles he fired into Israel during the Gulf War of 1991. Nestled beside the Yazidi temple, there was a structure featuring a slab of six-foot-wide concrete steps that appeared to lead 30 feet up into nowhere. It was from there, some locals believed, that Saddam launched his Scuds.”
The war correspondent’s dispatch on the Islamic Republic’s use of Sinjar as part of the Shi’ite corridor is telling regarding Tehran’s imperialist project.
“Further down the mountain, however, the roads and towns were controlled by a variety of militias influenced or entirely controlled by Iran. With that influence, military analysts fear, came the power for Iran to create trouble for its enemies far beyond what Hussein attempted,” she writes.
McKay goes on to quote my Foundation for Defense of Democracies colleague and Iran missile specialist Behnam Ben Taleblu, who says, “Iran’s present arsenal is more diverse and more capable than Saddam’s arsenal. Iran’s missiles can function as both a tool of deterrence and coercion.”
McKay’s book is required reading for anyone wishing to understand the emergence of the Islamic State, and its wretched effects on the minds and bodies of Middle Easterners during the period 2014-2018.
Only Cry for the Living is a superlative achievement of journalism and literary style.
The writer is a fellow for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
Gideon Sa'ar 是以色列最有影響力的部長嗎？
在一個避免棘手問題的多元化議會中，吉迪恩·薩爾可以重塑法院和總檢察長數十年的權力。
作者：尤娜·傑瑞米·鮑勃、吉爾·霍夫曼
2021 年 10 月 7 日 16:33
吉迪恩·薩爾
（照片來源：拉米·澤格）
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除了可能通過預算和取消前總理本雅明·內塔尼亞胡的席位之外，目前尚不清楚現任政府是否會在任何重大問題上改變國家的遺產。
對於大多數部長來說可能都是如此，但司法部長吉迪恩·薩爾（Gideon Sa'ar）除外，他最近接受了雜誌的獨家採訪。
儘管他讓位，為納夫塔利·貝內特 (Naftali Bennett) 擔任總理職務鋪平了道路，但在所有部長中，薩爾通過重塑法院和司法部長的權力數十年，可能對所有部長產生最大的實際影響來。
儘管梅雷茨黨官員會見巴勒斯坦民族權力機構主席馬哈茂德·阿巴斯引起軒然大波，但薩爾正在採取行動，有時是公開的，有時是在雷達下，將最高法院的權力平衡從自由派陣營轉移到保守派陣營。
如果他的一位有影響力的前任阿耶萊特·沙克德 (Ayelet Shaked) 甚至未能將總檢察長辦公室拆分為獨立的首席法律顧問和首席檢察官，那麼薩爾比迄今為止任何人都更接近於實現這一意識形態權利的夢想.
薩爾對於他將推動誰作為強大的司法遴選委員會的負責人從 24 名候選人名單中填補最高法院目前空缺的四個空缺保持沉默。
在任命定於 11 月底填補的四個空缺和 2023 年的另外兩個空缺職位後，薩爾和委員會將取代超過三分之一的法院。法院已經從一個由自由派佔絕大多數的法院變成了一個溫和的自由派相對於保守派的優勢微乎其微的法院。
但是，如果他將保守派任命的人與自由派任命的人分成兩到兩個，鑑於三名自由派或溫和的自由派法官正在退休而只有一名溫和的保守派法官退休，這可能會使法院果斷地滑入保守派的行列。
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Sa'ar 投射出來自司法部長令人生畏的辦公桌背後的力量，他說：“這是一份高質量的名單，而且各方面都各不相同。我不會僅僅根據人們是保守派還是自由派來判斷他們。還有很多其他的測量方法。有些人有更多的民法背景和一些政府行政委員會的經驗。即使在刑法中，也有更注重辯護的人與更注重起訴的人。”
“有兩個目標：卓越和多樣性。在過去的 15 年裡，高等法院變得比以前更加多樣化……這很好……我通過 2007 年的法律為此做出了貢獻”，該法律改變了司法遴選委員會的組成，要求九分之七他說，對每個被選中的候選人進行投票共識。
Gideon Sa'ar（圖片來源：MARC ISRAEL SELLEM）
此外，報告顯示將推動任命地方法院法官拉姆·維諾格拉德和前州破產事務負責人大衛·哈恩等保守派人士。
關於評論周一爆發的一場爭議，該爭議威脅到地方法院法官 Khaled Kabub 幾乎可以保證的席位，以填補法庭上傳統的以色列 - 阿拉伯席位，而喬治·卡拉法官將退休，薩爾很謹慎。
Sa'ar 說他不想討論關於 Kabub 的具體指控。爭議圍繞著 Kabub 是否知道他遇到的一些與他父親一起工作的以色列-阿拉伯活動家的一些有問題的活動。
但他也不會保證 Kabub 的座位是 100% 堅固的。此外，他說委員會甚至有可能在 24 人名單中增加新的名字。這句話暗示需要有一名以色列-阿拉伯候選人來取代卡拉，因此如果需要，可以增加一名新的以色列-阿拉伯候選人。不過，Sa'ar 澄清說，這不是他的偏好，因為法律要求延遲重新發布更新後的名單。
同時，他希望在 11 月底之前提名四名新法官，增加新候選人可能會導致延誤。
必須在 2023 年 10 月之前填補的另外兩個空位呢？
從技術上講，根據非常複雜的聯盟協議，薩爾將於 2023 年 8 月離開司法部前往外交部——比空位需要填補的時間早幾個月。
薩爾自信地表示，這兩個職位將在他擔任司法部長期間填補。
他指出，儘管他和委員會即將填補的四個最高法院席位中有兩個自去年 4 月以來一直空缺，但他們正在提前任命其中兩個席位，儘管這些席位要到 2022 年 4 月才會空缺。
雖然薩爾可能在其他問題上做出妥協——例如他希望通過一項新的基本法來重組政府部門之間的權力分立——但他很清楚，挑選所有六名法官是一個紅線優先事項。他。
耶路撒冷最高法院鳥瞰圖（來源：MARC ISRAEL SELLEM）
拆分總檢察長的角色
薩爾計劃拆分總檢察長的角色，這似乎至少推遲了幾個月？
“在零時間的情況下這樣做是不切實際的。我們需要選擇正確的模型……我會把它帶給政府。會有不同的看法。任何決定都需要以色列議會。他說，我們知道情況，在 2 月 1 日前選出新總檢察長之前，沒有辦法做到這一切。
司法部長解釋說：“在有新的總檢察長或在預算通過之前，我們不能這樣做。任何被選中的人都會知道，總檢察長目前的權力可能會發生分裂。”
這是否意味著他將取消任何不接受分權的候選人的資格？
一方面，他回答說：“我不想提出先決條件。但是 [Attorney-General Avichai] Mandelblit 說這不是法律問題。”
另一方面，他承認曼德爾布利特個人並不認為分裂當局是正確的政策，他說，“如果有人說他們只會成為總檢察長”而沒有權力分裂，薩爾說，“我們會考慮到這一點。”
他對拉茲·尼茲裡（Raz Nizri），他是最高、也是更保守的副檢察長之一，或任何其他填補該職位的具體候選人不置可否。
儘管如此，在薩爾細緻入微的回答中，這對潛在候選人來說是一個非常明確的信息，即如果他們反對分裂，他們被選中的機會幾乎為零。
在預算獲得通過，聯盟的左翼政黨沒有理由配合他們普遍反對的倡議後，薩爾真的能做出這一重大改變嗎？
薩爾回應說，在他任職的三個政府中，“我不記得我提出了一項法案但沒有獲得多數票的情況。如果我提出來，我將確保獲得多數票。”
總檢察長 Avichai Mandelblit：Sa'ar 拆分 A-G 辦公室的計劃是什麼？（信用：TOMER NEUBERG/FLASH90）
他還表示，Yesh Atid 有義務在聯盟內投票支持該法案。這意味著，即使左翼政黨最初可能會反對該法案，但如果聯盟獲得通過，他們最終將有義務在議會中投票支持該法案。
他是否認為總理任期限制的立法和總理的反起訴法案不是針對個人的？
雖然政府在議會中的首要目標是通過國家預算，但薩爾並沒有等待推進他最關心的立法：被公眾稱為“反比比”法案的提案。
第一項法案將總理的任期限制為八年。第二個將阻止被起訴的候選人組建政府。這兩項法案都將在本月預算通過成為法律之前提交。
薩爾堅稱，這兩項法案都不是針對反對派領導人本傑明·內塔尼亞胡的個人立法。第一個不會是內塔尼亞胡的祖父，內塔尼亞胡是唯一一位擔任八年總理的在世以色列人。如果該法案通過，他還可以再服役八年。
“利庫德集團在看到該法案之前就在傳播錯誤信息，”薩爾說。
這兩項法案都不會在下一屆以色列議會生效。這意味著，如果當前議會有建設性的不信任動議，內塔尼亞胡仍然可以重新掌權，但如果第二項法案通過，除非他的腐敗指控被清除，否則他將無法在下一屆議會擔任總理。
他說：“我只是希望市長們已經有了一個規範。” “該法案不是針對個人的；反對它是個人的。有一個政黨被其領導人和他的審判所俘虜。讓被起訴的人成為總理不是一種意識形態。我們看到了當被起訴的總理試圖管理一個國家時會發生什麼。當下一任司法部長被選出時，他繼續發起選舉以繼續執政。一個國家不能屈從於一個人的利益。”
薩爾表示，他將游說他的部長同事以獲得多數票，他相信這兩項法案都會通過。但他不會妨礙下一場利庫德集團領導力競賽，在這場競賽中，內塔尼亞胡的潛在挑戰者會悄悄地很高興看到法案在競賽舉行之前獲得通過。
“我不會干涉利庫德集團，”他說。“他們有權做出自己的決定。”
但是，薩爾在本屆議會中通過成為法律的第一項法案也是關於他以前的政黨的。它允許四個 MK 從一個大黨中脫離，而不是派系的三分之一，在利庫德集團的情況下，這將是十個 MK。薩爾說，他沒有想到任何潛在的叛逃者，但他不排除試圖在本屆議會中實施該法案。
2013 年與本傑明·內塔尼亞胡在以色列議會中並肩。（來源：FLASH90）
他選擇將其設置為 4 個 MK，因為這是跨越閾值的最小 MK 數量。二十年前，當只需要一個 MK 分裂，然後需要三分之一的派系，這是相反的極端，薩爾認為四個是適當的妥協。
但同樣明顯的是，Ra'am（阿拉伯聯合酋長國名單）恰好有四個 MK，而且有些 MK 會覺得不必在每次投票中都依賴 Mansour Abbas 的政黨會更自在。Sa'ar 說他與 Ra'am 合作沒有問題。
“你不會認同你的合作夥伴在聯盟系統中所做的一切，但我知道 Ra'am 的觀點，沒有發生任何我不能容忍的事情，”他說。“除一方外，所有各方都同意與拉姆坐在一起。我不接受雙重標準，內塔尼亞胡可以接受的事情對我來說是被禁止的。”
他繼續說：“Ra'am 只想處理民事問題。這是一個重要的實驗，我希望它能奏效。我希望聯盟更廣泛，但我不後悔組建現任政府。我們使以色列免於更加惡化和不穩定。想像一下，如果我們現在就去選舉而不是通過預算。”
以色列-阿拉伯暴力浪潮和使用 Shin Bet
薩爾警告說，當前的以色列-阿拉伯暴力浪潮對以色列國的威脅比哈馬斯和真主黨更大，並指出阿拉伯地區 50% 的謀殺案仍未解決。
“[以色列-阿拉伯地區]的有組織犯罪現像比外部威脅更危及以色列，”他說。“如果你不知道如何處理這個問題，它會導致社區從內部崩潰。”
Sa'ar 談到了以色列安全局（Shin Bet）參與打擊謀殺浪潮的潛在陷阱，而不是讓警察來處理它，薩爾說“Shin Bet 法授權該機構處理有組織犯罪”，例如作為當前正在“破壞法治基礎”的以色列-阿拉伯暴力浪潮。
“這很聰明，”他說。“這是一個艱難的局面，我們需要所有的州當局。我們明天不會用他們來取代警察，但他們 [the Shin Bet] 可以以不同的方式提供幫助。”
當注意到許多 Shin Bet 官員不願意參與他們更常規的反恐任務之外的任何事情時，Sa'ar 說：“當他們被要求時，他們會全力以赴”。
此外，當前暴力浪潮的元素也已蔓延到民族主義犯罪中，他說，Shin Bet 的能力最適合打擊阿以地區大約 500,000 件非法武器。
3 月 5 日，以色列 - 阿拉伯人在烏姆法赫姆抗議其社區之間的暴力、有組織犯罪和殺戮（圖片來源：RONI OFER/FLASH90）
薩爾表示，他將堅持完成一項法案，要求對持有非法武器的人判處最低刑期。他表示，他還將擴大經濟法庭的權力，以採取行動打擊有組織犯罪的逃稅和洗錢活動，並使警方能夠採取更多措施防止證據丟失。
梅雷茨會見馬哈茂德·阿巴斯
相比之下，薩爾淡化了領導巴勒斯坦人的其他阿巴斯的重要性。他說，梅雷茨部長與巴勒斯坦權力機構主席馬哈茂德·阿巴斯的會晤是在浪費時間。
“這樣的會議沒有那麼重要的外交意義，”他說。“巴勒斯坦權力機構仍在試圖起訴我們在海牙的士兵並向恐怖分子及其家人付款。只要他們不停止，我就不會見巴勒斯坦官員。聯盟中的左翼代表可能會因此而感到沮喪，他們可能有政治需求，但這個組成的政府將無法在猶太和撒馬利亞建立巴勒斯坦國，這將危及以色列。”
國際刑事法院
談到以色列因涉嫌戰爭罪而與國際刑事法院攤牌時，他被要求解決一些猜測，即即使新任國際刑事法院檢察官卡里姆汗在上任的前三個月沒有打擾以色列，但以色列人在未來可能面臨國際逮捕令。
“我不想進行投機。我不知道這種猜測的依據是什麼。我們知道以色列國防軍是最有道德的軍隊，我們知道以色列有內部調查程序，如果以色列國防軍發生不適當的事情——而且這種[調查]比大多數西方軍隊發生的情況要多。”
薩爾說，海牙的刑事調查是巴勒斯坦權力機構製造的政治劇。
他說，巴勒斯坦權力機構“對解決衝突不感興趣，正在對以色列採取措施。[在國際刑事法院] 的過程是關於使以色列合法化。”
“我與 PA 的關係受此影響。巴勒斯坦權力機構在其戰略中使用恐怖手段……但他們對以色列的所作所為同樣有害。”
“前任首席檢察官在她 [9 年] 任期結束時做出了決定。除了這些一般原則之外，我不想對此公開過多評論：我認為法院的決定是不正確的。它基於非民族國家 [PA] 發出的投訴，因此無權 [提出投訴]。
此外，他補充說，“該物質也是錯誤的。以色列有一個調查這些問題的法律機構。我只是希望未來的處理方式與以前的處理方式不同。”
國際刑事法院：往下看。（信用：Rick Bajornas/聯合國通過 Flickr）
一個重要的衍生問題是誰將在國際刑事法院為司法部處理巴勒斯坦權力機構針對以色列的行動。自 2013 年 10 月以來，負責國際事務的副總檢察長 Roy Schondorf 在專家專業層面率先解決了這個問題，並與以色列法律團隊的其他成員一起，至少將目前的刑事調查推遲了大約 6 年。 2015 年 1 月開始初步審查。
他的八年任期將於本月晚些時候到期，但接替他的遴選程序尚未開始。
該雜誌了解到，此時最有可能的情況是，薩爾將把 Schondorf 的任期延長幾個月，直到出現更換程序，並且可能直到 2 月 1 日之後新的總檢察長可以對這個問題進行權衡。關於誰將處理 ICC-PA 產品組合。
為巴勒斯坦人在東耶路撒冷重新開放美國領事館
薩爾表示，即使拜登政府要求，他也將盡一切可能阻止在耶路撒冷中部的美國領事館重新開放，該領事館將為巴勒斯坦權力機構服務。
“耶路撒冷是一個原則問題，”他說。“與美國的關係非常重要。我聽到了華盛頓的意見，但我們對耶路撒冷作為我們永恆首都的看法同樣強烈。它需要以色列的批准，而美國不能單方面這樣做。因此，他們需要考慮我們的觀點和原則。”
Sa'ar 還打算阻止勞工和 Meretz 改變財政部的首選社區名單，該名單目前為許多定居點帶來了好處。該名單將在未來幾個月內進行投票。
“我們將堅持我們的原則，我們不會讓一張與我們的前景背道而馳的地圖，”他說。
至於工黨提出的新《平等基本法》的提議，薩爾表示，在上屆以色列議會中，他提出了一項法案，將平等原則納入現行的《人的尊嚴和自由基本法》，他仍會支持這樣做，但他不會允許通過一項新法律。
案例3000潛艇事務國家委員會
在這被視為對藍白黨領袖本尼·甘茨的一種姿態中，薩爾本週授權成立一個政府調查委員會，以調查所謂的潛艇事件。該委員會可以解決針對內塔尼亞胡一些前高級助手的第 3000 號刑事案件之外的適當治理問題，這也意味著審查內塔尼亞胡在其中的作用，儘管前總理不是刑事案件的被告。
當被問及他是否採取措施平息甘茨的政治獨立時，他說，當甘茨在政府成立後立即向媒體要求調查時，他沒有正確處理，但此後一直在幕後悄悄進行。
“有些事在他的權力範圍內，有些在我的權力範圍內，我們的部委之間進行了對話，”他說。“這實際上發生在幾週前，直到本週才有人問我這件事。”
當被問及他是否擔心甘茨推翻政府並與利庫德集團結盟時，薩爾說：“我認為本尼與內塔尼亞胡的伙伴關係沒有那麼美好的回憶。我不認為像甘茨這樣的聰明人會這樣做。”
薩爾可能不像去年民意調查顯示他達到 17 個席位時那樣大搖大擺，但在歷史記錄中，他可能是現任政府的最大成功者。
Is Gideon Sa'ar Israel's most impactful minister?
In a diverse Knesset avoiding hard issues, Gideon Sa’ar could reshape courts and A-G powers for decades.
By YONAH JEREMY BOB, GIL HOFFMAN
OCTOBER 7, 2021 16:33
Gideon Sa'ar
(photo credit: Rami Zernger)
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Besides likely passing a budget and unseating former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, it is not clear that the current government will have much of a lasting legacy in changing the country on any major issues.
This could be true for most ministers, with the exception of Justice Minister Gideon Sa’ar who recently gave an exclusive interview to the Magazine.
Though he moved aside to pave the way for Naftali Bennett to take the prime minister’s chair, it is Sa’ar who may have the greatest actual impact of all of the ministers, by reshaping the courts and the powers of the attorney-general for decades to come.
Despite the uproar about Meretz Party officials meeting with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, Sa’ar is moving, sometimes publicly and sometimes under the radar, to shift the balance of power on the Supreme Court from the liberal camp to the conservative camp.
If one of his influential predecessors, Ayelet Shaked, failed to get even close to splitting the attorney-general’s office into a separate chief legal adviser and chief prosecutor, Sa’ar is closer to succeeding on this dream of the ideological Right than anyone to date.
Sa’ar was mum about exactly who he would push for as head of the powerful Judicial Selection Committee from the list of 24 candidates to fill the four slots currently open on the Supreme Court.
After making appointments to those four vacancies due to be filled by the end of November and to two more openings in 2023, Sa’ar and the committee will have replaced more than one-third of the court. The court has already been changed from one overwhelmingly filled by liberals to that of one with a razor-thin edge of moderate liberals over conservatives.
But if he gets even a two to two split of conservative appointees to liberal appointees, this could slide the court decisively into the conservative column given that three liberal or moderate-liberal justices are retiring and only one moderate conservative is.
Projecting the strength that comes from behind the formidable desk of the justice minister, Sa’ar said, “It is a high-quality list and diverse on all sides. I don’t judge people just on if they are conservative or liberal. There are lots of other ways to measure. Some have more civil law backgrounds and some experience with government administrative committees. Even within criminal law, there are those who are more defense-minded versus those who are more prosecution-minded.”
“There are two goals: excellence and diversity. The High Court has gotten more heterogeneous over the last 15 years than before… this is good… I helped contribute to this through the 2007 law,” which changed the makeup of the Judicial Selection Committee to require a seven out of nine vote consensus for each candidate to be selected, he said.
Gideon Sa'ar (credit: MARC ISRAEL SELLEM)
Further, reports indicate there will be a push to appoint conservatives like District Court Judge Ram Winograd and former state bankruptcy chief David Hahn.
Regarding commenting on a controversy that erupted on Monday threatening District Court Judge Khaled Kabub’s almost-guaranteed seat to fill the traditional Israeli-Arab seat on the court with Justice George Kara retiring, Sa’ar was careful.
Sa’ar said he did not want to discuss the specific allegations regarding Kabub. The controversy surrounds whether Kabub knew some of the problematic activities of some Israeli-Arab activists he had met who had worked with his father.
But he also would not promise that Kabub’s seat was 100% solid. Further, he said that it was even possible for the committee to add new names to the 24-person list. This remark leaves open the implication that there would need to be an Israeli-Arab candidate to replace Kara, so if need be, a new Israeli-Arab candidate could be added. Sa’ar clarified, though, that this was not his preference, since the law would require a delay to republish the updated list.
Meanwhile, he wishes to nominate the four new justices by the end of November, and adding new candidates could cause a delay.
What about the other two slots which must be filled by October 2023?
Technically, according to the very complex coalition agreement, Sa’ar is due to leave the Justice Ministry for the Foreign Ministry in August 2023 – a couple of months before the slots would need to be filled.
Sa’ar confidently said these two slots would be filled during his term as justice minister.
He noted that although two of the four Supreme Court seats he and the committee are about to fill have been empty since April this past year, they are appointing two of the seats in advance even though they will not be vacant until April 2022.
While there may be other issues where Sa’ar has compromised – such as his desire to pass a new Basic Law to restructure the separation of powers between the branches of government – he was clear that picking all six justices was a red-line priority for him.
AERIAL VIEW of Supreme Court in Jerusalem (credit: MARC ISRAEL SELLEM)
Splitting the roles of the attorney-general
What about Sa’ar’s plans to split the roles of the attorney-general, which seems to have been delayed by at least several months?
“It was not practical to do this, with zero time. We need to pick the right model… I will bring it to the government. There will be different views. Any decision needs the Knesset. We know the situation and there is no way to do all of this before the selection” of the new attorney-general by February 1, he said.
The justice minister explained, “We cannot do this before there is a new attorney-general or before the budget passes. Anyone who will be selected will know that the splitting of the attorney-general’s current powers could happen.”
Does this mean that he would disqualify any candidates who did not accept the idea of splitting the office’s powers?
On one hand, he responded, “I do not want to make preconditions. But [Attorney-General Avichai] Mandelblit says it is not a legal problem.”
On the other hand, he acknowledged that Mandelblit personally does not view the splitting authorities as the right policy and he said, “If someone says they will only be [the] attorney-general” without the powers split, Sa’ar said, “we will take this into account.”
He was also non-committal on Raz Nizri, one of the top and also more conservative deputy attorneys-general, or about any other specific candidate to fill the post.
Still, in the world of Sa’ar’s nuanced answers, this was a pretty clear message to the potential candidates that their chances of being picked if they oppose the split are close to nil.
Can Sa’ar really get this major change made after the budget is passed and the left-wing parties of the coalition have less reason to cooperate with an initiative they generally oppose?
Sa’ar responded that in the three governments he served in, “I do not remember a situation where I put forward a bill and did not get a majority. If I bring it forward, I will make sure to get a majority.”
ATTORNEY-GENERAL Avichai Mandelblit: What of Sa’ar’s plans to split the A-G’s office? (credit: TOMER NEUBERG/FLASH90)
He also said that Yesh Atid is obligated to vote for the bill within the coalition. This means that even if left-wing parties might initially oppose the bill, if the vote carries in the coalition, they will be obligated to vote for it eventually in the Knesset.
Does he consider legislation for a prime minister term limit and anti-indictment bills for PM as not personal?
While the government’s top immediate goal in the Knesset is passing the state budget, Sa’ar is not waiting to advance the legislation he cares most about: The proposals known to the public as the “anti-Bibi” bills.
The first bill would limit a prime minister to eight years in office. The second would prevent a candidate under indictment from forming a government. Both bills will be presented this month before the bu