本集介紹

2021.07.14 國際新聞導讀-FDA說打第三劑無必要、土耳其真的想與以色列改善關係？以色列對迦薩重建的態度及對西岸法塔政權的海關稅返還扣除手段

FDA 表示，輝瑞冠狀病毒疫苗加強注射是不必要的
在 BioNTech SE 宣布計劃在變種和數據傳播的情況下，尋求美國和歐洲監管機構批准其第三劑 COVID-19注射劑之後，FDA 宣布了這一消息。
通過路透
2021 年 7 月 13 日 13:18
在這張 2020 年 10 月 31 日拍攝的插圖中，在顯示的輝瑞標誌前可以看到貼有“COVID-19/冠狀病毒疫苗/僅注射”標籤的小瓶和一個醫用注射器
（圖片來源：路透社/DADO RUVIC/插圖/文件照片）
廣告
該公司週日表示，COVID-19疫苗製造商輝瑞公司週一與聯邦衛生官員會面，討論在準備尋求授權時是否需要加強劑量的冠狀病毒疫苗。
會議召開前幾天，該製藥商及其合作夥伴 BioNTech SE 宣布計劃尋求美國和歐洲監管機構批准第三劑 COVID-19 注射劑，因為變種和數據的傳播表明他們表示初始接種六個月後感染風險增加.
這一推動促使美國食品藥品監督管理局和疾病控制與預防中心迅速做出反應，稱美國人現在不需要助推器。
輝瑞公司發言人表示，週一，輝瑞公司計劃與 FDA 的代表會面。華盛頓郵報首先報導了這次會議。
美國衛生與公共服務部的代表沒有立即回應置評請求。
喬·拜登總統的首席醫療顧問兼美國國家過敏症和傳染病研究所負責人安東尼·福奇，以及美國國立衛生研究院和疾病預防控制中心的負責人也被邀請參加簡報會，簡報會可能會移到另一天，根據郵報的報導。
福奇在周日的幾次電視採訪中表示，美國衛生官員並沒有否認未來可能需要加強劑——尤其是在接種疫苗的人中出現了突破性感染的情況下——但任何正式建議都需要更多的數據。
“現在有很多動態的事情正在發生，”他告訴美國廣播公司新聞的“本週”節目。
他在 CNN 的“State of of工會。”
儘管FDA 和 CDC 發表聲明，“這並不意味著我們不會非常非常積極地跟踪和收集所有這些信息，以查看我們是否以及何時可能需要它，如果需要以及何時需要，我們將擁有一切到位去做。”
美國衛生官員仍在努力讓某些地區的人們接受初步接種，因為具有高度傳染性的 Delta 變種已成為美國的主要毒株，而 COVID-19 病例主要在未接種疫苗的人群中上升。
歐洲官員還表示，疫苗目前似乎對變種具有保護作用。加拿大還表示正在監測變種和可能需要的助推器。
雖然一些科學家也質疑加強注射的必要性，但其他人表示，它們可能對老年人和其他弱勢群體有益，儘管尚不清楚何時需要。
一些公共衛生專家還表示擔心，在其他國家仍在努力應對初始接種的情況下，在富裕的發達國家授權加強疫苗將進一步加劇疫苗的不平等。
Pfizer coronavirus vaccine booster shot unnecessary, FDA says
The FDA announcement came after BioNTech SE announced plans to seek US and European regulatory approval for a third dose of their COVID-19 shot amid the spread of variants and data.
By REUTERS
JULY 13, 2021 13:18

Vials with a sticker reading, "COVID-19 / Coronavirus vaccine / Injection only" and a medical syringe are seen in front of a displayed Pfizer logo in this illustration taken October 31, 2020
(photo credit: REUTERS/DADO RUVIC/ILLUSTRATION/FILE PHOTO)
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COVID-19 vaccine maker Pfizer Inc met with federal health officials on Monday to discuss the need for a booster dose of the coronavirus vaccine as it prepares to seek authorization, the company said on Sunday.
The meeting comes days after the drugmaker and its partner BioNTech SE announced plans to seek US and European regulatory approval for a third dose of their COVID-19 shot amid the spread of variants and data they said showed heightened risk of infection six months after initial inoculation.
That push prompted a quick response from the US Food and Drug Administration and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, saying Americans do not need a booster right now.
On Monday, Pfizer is scheduled to meet with representatives of the FDA, a company spokesperson said. The meeting was first reported by the Washington Post.
Representatives for the US Department of Health and Human Services did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Anthony Fauci, President Joe Biden’s chief medical adviser who also directs the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, as well as the heads of the National Institutes of Health and the CDC were also among those invited to the briefing, which could move to another day, according to the Post's report.
Fauci, in several television interviews on Sunday, said US health officials were not dismissing the possible future need for boosters -- especially as breakthrough infections among those who have been vaccinated have emerged -- but that more data is needed for any formal recommendation.
"There's a lot of dynamic things going on right now," he told ABC News' "This Week" program.
"There are studies being done now ongoing as we speak about looking at the feasibility about if and when we should be boosting people… there's a lot of work going on to examine this in real time," he added on CNN's "State of the Union."
Despite the FDA and CDC's statement, "that doesn't mean that we're not very, very actively following and gathering all of this information to see if and when we might need it and if and when we do, we'll have everything in place to do it."
US health officials are still struggling to get people in some areas to receive their initial inoculations as the highly contagious Delta variant has grown to be the nation's dominant strain, with COVID-19 cases rising mostly among the unvaccinated.
European officials has also said vaccines currently seem protective against variants. Canada has also said it is monitoring variants and the possible need for boosters.
While some scientists have also questioned the need for booster shots, others have said they could be beneficial for the elderly and other vulnerable populations, although it is unclear when they would be needed.
Some public health experts have also expressed concern that authorizing boosters in wealthy developed nations while other countries are still struggling against initial inoculations will further exacerbate vaccine inequity.
越南將混合劑量的輝瑞和阿斯利康 COVID-19 疫苗
根據初步結果，西班牙的一項研究發現輝瑞和阿斯利康的組合非常安全和有效。
通過路透
2021 年 7 月 13 日 15:50

2021 年 2 月 7 日，在奧地利維也納成立為冠狀病毒病疫苗接種中心的維也納展覽中心會議中心，一名醫護人員將一劑輝瑞-BioNTech COVID-19 疫苗交給醫生。
（照片來源：路透社/LISI NIESNER/文件照片）
廣告
河內——越南政府週二表示，越南將提供輝瑞和 BioNTech 聯合開發的冠狀病毒疫苗作為首次接種阿斯利康疫苗的人的第二劑選擇。
越南的大規模接種運動尚處於初期階段，迄今只有不到 30 萬人接種了疫苗。到目前為止，它已經使用了阿斯利康的病毒載體疫苗，並於上週交付了 97,000 劑輝瑞-BioNTech mRNA 疫苗。
政府在一份聲明中說：“輝瑞疫苗將優先用於 8-12 週前第一次接種阿斯利康的人。”
包括加拿大、西班牙和韓國在內的幾個國家已經批准了這種劑量混合，主要是因為擔心與阿斯利康疫苗相關的罕見且可能致命的血栓。
根據初步結果，西班牙的一項研究發現輝瑞和阿斯利康的組合非常安全和有效。
但世界衛生組織的首席科學家週一建議不要混合和匹配 COVID-19 疫苗，稱其為“危險趨勢”，因為關於健康影響的數據很少。
隨著感染速度的增長，越南一直在努力加快其疫苗接種運動，本月已八次創下每日記錄。週二報告了 2,031 例新感染病例，其中大部分發生在震中胡志明市。
在 2021 年 5 月之前，它總共記錄了不到 3,000 例冠狀病毒病例。它的案件量現在是 34,500，其中 130 人死亡。
越南周二表示，它將很快收到澳大利亞捐贈的 150 萬劑阿斯利康疫苗，以及本週來自日本的另外一批 100 萬劑疫苗。
Vietnam to mix doses of Pfizer, AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccines
A Spanish study found the Pfizer-AstraZeneca combination was highly safe and effective, according to preliminary results.
By REUTERS
JULY 13, 2021 15:50

A healthcare worker hands over doses of the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine to a doctor at Messe Wien Congress Center, which has been set up as coronavirus disease vaccination centre, in Vienna, Austria February 7, 2021.
(photo credit: REUTERS/LISI NIESNER/FILE PHOTO)
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HANOI - Vietnam will offer the coronavirus vaccine jointly developed by Pfizer and BioNTech as a second dose option for people first inoculated with the AstraZeneca vaccine, the government said on Tuesday.
Vietnam's mass inoculation campaign is in its early stages, with less than 300,000 people fully vaccinated so far. It has so far used AstraZeneca's viral vector vaccine and last week took delivery of 97,000 doses of the Pfizer-BioNTech mRNA shot.
"Pfizer vaccines will be prioritized for people who were given first shot of AstraZeneca 8-12 weeks before," the government said in a statement.
Several countries, including Canada, Spain and South Korea, have already approved such dose-mixing mainly due to concerns about rare and potentially fatal blood clots linked to the AstraZeneca vaccine.
A Spanish study found the Pfizer-AstraZeneca combination was highly safe and effective, according to preliminary results.
But the World Health Organization's chief scientist advised on Monday against mixing and matching COVID-19 vaccines, calling it a "dangerous trend" since there was little data available about the health impact.
Vietnam has been trying to expedite its vaccination campaign as the pace of infections grow, having hit daily records eight times this month. It reported 2,031 new infections on Tuesday, most of those in the epicenter Ho Chi Minh City.
Prior to May 2021, it had recorded less than 3,000 coronavirus cases in total. Its caseload is now 34,500, with 130 deaths.
Vietnam said on Tuesday it would soon receive 1.5 million doses of the AstraZeneca vaccine donated by Australia and an additional batch of one million doses of the vaccine from Japan this week.
以色列應該警惕土耳其的禮物 - 評論
埃爾多安是想升溫與以色列的關係還是向他們潑冷水？無論如何，誰會從評論如此矛盾的人那裡購買二手車？
作者：HERB KEINON
2021 年 7 月 13 日 22:40

土耳其總統塔伊普·埃爾多安於 2021 年 3 月 4 日在土耳其安卡拉通過視頻鏈接參加了他執政的 AK 黨的會議。
（圖片來源：總統新聞辦公室/通過路透社的講義）
廣告
18年後你會認識一個人。
18 年是雷傑普·塔伊普·埃爾多安 (Recep Tayyip Erdogan ) 領導土耳其的時間：前 11 年擔任總理，後 7 年擔任總統。
在此期間，以土關係從黃金時代進入了黑暗時代。不是因為以色列在 2003 年埃爾多安上台後的行為方式與兩國戰略聯盟之前的行為完全不同，而是因為埃爾多安 - 以其根深蒂固的伊斯蘭世界觀 - 從根本上改變了土耳其對以色列的態度。
埃爾多安將以色列從盟友變成敵人、朋友變成敵人、在國際舞台上的伙伴變成方便的鞭打男孩，以在國內獲得政治點數和穆斯林世界的熱烈掌聲。
早在 2009 年，時任以色列大使加比·利維（Gabby Levy）在維基解密電報中被引述說埃爾多安是一個“原教旨主義者”，“在宗教上憎恨我們”。那是在 2010 年 Mavi Marmara 船隊事件之前，在 2014 年在加沙的保護邊緣行動之前，以及在 2018 年美國大使館搬到耶路撒冷之前。
週一晚上，同一個埃爾多安打電話給新總統艾薩克·赫爾佐格，並傳達了一個簡單的信息：讓我們重新開始。
可愛的情緒，儘管考慮到埃爾多安的過往記錄，但很難不質疑他的誠意。
5 月，在聖殿山發生騷亂之後，土耳其總統這樣評價以色列：“殘忍的恐怖主義國家以色列襲擊了耶路撒冷的穆斯林，他們唯一關心的是保護他們的家園和他們的神聖價值觀，以野蠻的方式沒有道德的方式。”
然而，週一，他的辦公室發表了他與赫爾佐格通話的聲明，稱土耳其總統“強調土以關係對中東的安全與穩定非常重要，而且存在巨大潛力。促進兩國在各個領域的合作，特別是能源、旅遊和技術。”
然而，就在第二天，他的辦公室發表了另一份不那麼和解的聲明，猛烈抨擊以色列拆毀房屋，並說“我們譴責以色列的非法和不人道做法，並在此重申我們支持司法程序，讓以色列對其在該國的罪行負責。被佔領土。”
那麼是哪一個？埃爾多安是想升溫與以色列的關係還是向他們潑冷水？無論如何，誰會從評論如此矛盾的人那裡購買二手車？就像一個男人追求一個女人，首先告訴一個朋友她很卑鄙，然後檢查她是否會和他約會，然後在他消除那些觸角後的第二天貶低她的外表。
是的，以色列很了解埃爾多安，18 年後它才知道是一個堅定的反以色列伊斯蘭主義者，他一直試圖煽動穆斯林世界反對這個猶太國家，並經常兜售反猶太主義言論來這樣做。
他是一位具有新奧斯曼幻想的領導人，他支持 2010 年馬維馬爾馬拉的挑釁，當時以色列突擊隊登上一艘被派往打破以色列對哈馬斯控制的加沙地帶的合法海上封鎖的船隻，並在遭到襲擊後殺死了船上的 9 人。
以色列知道埃爾多安的土耳其是如何接待哈馬斯辦公室的，在那裡計劃襲擊以色列人。它知道從土耳其出來的哈馬斯洗錢活動，以及為恐怖組織成員提供護照。
它知道土耳其為破壞以色列-塞浦路斯-希臘天然氣管道所做的努力；關於它在各種國際論壇上不斷試圖破壞以色列的方式；以及它對伊朗的偶爾支持（當它符合其利益時）。
而這些只是安卡拉對以色列採取的部分行動。它對該地區其他人採取的無數行動——從庫爾德人到埃及人，再到塞浦路斯人和希臘人——讓耶路撒冷感到厭惡。
但是，當埃爾多安打電話並輕聲細語時，自然會想說：“這太棒了——讓我們試一試，重新開始吧。” 然而，以色列不能對它在與誰打交道抱有任何幻想。
在宣讀埃爾多安辦公室與赫爾佐格的通話時，土耳其總統強調“為解決巴以爭端採取的積極步驟也將促進土耳其與以色列關係的積極發展。 ”
然而，以色列需要讓土耳其知道它有自己的期望和要求。
如果安卡拉希望建立更好的關係以緩解其地區孤立，幫助與白宮建立更好的關係，並從以色列在“能源、旅遊和技術”方面提供的東西中受益，那麼埃爾多安需要停止他尖銳的反以色列和反猶太主義修辭。
他需要停止指責以色列進行種族滅絕，停止將以色列與納粹進行比較，停止幫助和教唆哈馬斯，停止試圖入侵耶路撒冷，停止在經濟上支持那些在聖殿山上煽動的人，停止在北約阻撓以色列，停止試圖魚雷猶太國家與穆斯林世界其他國家的新興聯繫。例如，就在幾個月前，埃爾多安威脅要從阿聯酋召回他的大使，以抗議其與耶路撒冷建立關係。
顯然，以色列將受益於與土耳其改善關係和更好的關係，不僅因為貿易增加，而且因為它是敘利亞和更廣泛地區的重要參與者，如果不包括在帳篷內，可能會造成巨大的破壞。在它之外。
與此同時，任何為恢復兩國之間曾經存在的親密關係而採取的行動都不能以犧牲以色列在過渡期間與土耳其的地區敵人建立更牢固的關係為代價，其中有很多：來自羅馬尼亞和保加利亞在巴爾幹半島，到地中海東部的塞浦路斯和希臘，到阿拉伯國家中的埃及和阿拉伯聯合酋長國。
當埃爾多安在本世紀的第一個十年改變土耳其的外交政策路線時，以色列失去了一個重要的戰略夥伴。但與其舉起雙手大喊“gevalt！” 耶路撒冷通過與鄰國其他國家結盟，找到了彌補失去土耳其的方法。
這些聯盟現在不能僅僅因為埃爾多安今天認為與猶太國家建立更好的關係符合他的利益——他已經一次又一次地明確表示他實際上厭惡這種關係。
土耳其媒體將與赫爾佐格的電話大肆渲染，以期在耶路撒冷新領導層的到來之際重啟關係。
但這是關於以色列與土耳其關係的硬道理：只有當土耳其最終獲得新領導人時，關係才會真正重啟，而以色列則不會。即使那一天到來，重建信任也需要時間，因為埃爾多安已經成功——通過他對以色列的不斷妖魔化——讓他的許多同胞反對這個猶太國家。
Israel should be wary of Turkey's gifts - comment
Does Erdogan want to warm up ties with Israel or throw ice-cold water on them? Regardless, who would buy a used car from someone whose comments were so contradictory?
By HERB KEINON
JULY 13, 2021 22:40


Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan attends a meeting of his ruling AK Party via video link in Ankara, Turkey March 4, 2021.
(photo credit: PRESIDENTIAL PRESS OFFICE/HANDOUT VIA REUTERS)
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You get to know a guy after 18 years.
And 18 years is how long Recep Tayyip Erdogan has led Turkey: the first 11 as prime minister and the last seven as president.
During that period, Israeli-Turkish ties went from the Golden Era to the Dark Ages. Not because Israel acted in a radically different way after Erdogan came to power in 2003 than it did beforehand when the two countries enjoyed a strategic alliance, but because Erdogan – with his deeply embedded Islamic worldview – fundamentally changed Turkey’s attitude toward Israel.
Erdogan turned Israel from ally into adversary, friend to foe, partner on the international stage to convenient whipping boy in order to gain political points domestically and tumultuous applause in the Muslim world.
Already in 2009, Israel’s ambassador at the time, Gabby Levy, was quoted in a Wikileaks cable as saying that Erdogan was a “fundamentalist” who “hates us religiously.” And that was before the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident in 2010, before Operation Protective Edge in Gaza in 2014, and before the US embassy moved to Jerusalem in 2018.
On Monday evening, that same Erdogan called new President Isaac Herzog with a simple message: Let’s start afresh.
Lovely sentiment, though considering Erdogan’s track record, it’s rather difficult not to question his sincerity.
In May, following riots on the Temple Mount, the Turkish president had this to say about Israel: “Israel, the cruel terrorist state, attacks the Muslims in Jerusalem, whose only concern is to protect their homes and their sacred values, in a savage manner devoid of ethics.”
Yet, on Monday, his office put out a statement of his call with Herzog that said the Turkish president “underscored that Turkey-Israel relations were of great importance in terms of security and stability in the Middle East, and that there was a great potential for cooperation between the two countries in various areas, notably energy, tourism and technology.”
The very next day, however, his office put out another statement, less conciliatory, slamming Israel for house demolitions and saying “we condemn Israel’s unlawful and inhumane practices and hereby reiterate our support for the judicial process to hold Israel accountable for its crimes in the occupied territories.”
SO WHICH is it? Does Erdogan want to warm up ties with Israel or throw ice-cold water on them? Regardless, who would buy a used car from someone whose comments were so contradictory? It’s like a man courting a woman who first tells a friend that she is despicable, then checks to see if she might go out with him on a date, and then the day after he put out those feelers disparages her appearance.
Yes, Israel knows Erdogan well, and what it has come to know after 18 long years is a staunchly anti-Israel Islamist who consistently tries to inflame the Muslim world against the Jewish state, often peddling in antisemitic rhetoric to do so.
He is a leader with neo-Ottoman fantasies who supported the 2010 Mavi Marmara provocation where Israeli commandos boarded a ship sent to break Israel’s lawful naval blockade of the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip and, after coming under attack, killed nine people on that ship.
Israel knows how Erdogan’s Turkey has hosted an office of Hamas, where attacks against Israelis have been planned. It knows about the money laundering for Hamas coming out of Turkey, as well as the provision of passports for members of the terror organization.
It knows about Turkish efforts to scuttle an Israeli-Cypriot-Greek natural gas pipeline; about the way it constantly tries to undermine Israel in various international forums; and about its occasional support for Iran (when it suits its interests).
And those are just some of the actions Ankara has taken against Israel. There are also the myriad actions it has taken against others in the region – from the Kurds to the Egyptians to the Cypriots and Greeks – that Jerusalem finds loathsome.
But when Erdogan calls and whispers sweet nothings, there is a natural tendency to want to say, “That’s marvelous – let’s give it a whirl and start anew.” Yet Israel must harbor no illusions about who it is dealing with.
In the readout of the call with Herzog that Erdogan’s office put out, the Turkish president was quoted as stressing that “the positive steps to be taken for the settlement of the Palestine-Israel dispute would also facilitate a positive course in Turkey-Israel relations.”
ISRAEL NEEDS to let Turkey know, however, that it has expectations and demands of its own.
If Ankara wants better ties to ease its regional isolation, help build better relations with the White House and benefit from what Israel has to offer in terms of “energy, tourism and technology,” then Erdogan needs to stop his strident anti-Israel and antisemitic rhetoric.
He needs to stop accusing Israel of genocide, stop comparing Israel to Nazis, stop aiding and abetting Hamas, stop trying to make inroads in Jerusalem, stop financially backing those agitating on the Temple Mount, stop blocking Israel at NATO and stop trying to torpedo the Jewish state’s burgeoning ties with other countries in the Muslim world. Just a few months ago, for instance, Erdogan threatened to recall his ambassador from the UAE to protest its establishment of ties with Jerusalem.
Israel, obviously, would benefit from an improved relationship and better ties with Turkey, not only because of increased trade but also because it is an important player in Syria and the wider region, which if not included inside the tent, can cause tremendous damage from outside of it.
At the same time, any move towards reclaiming some of the closeness that once existed between the two countries must not be done at the expense of stronger relationships that Israel developed in the interim with Turkey’s regional foes, and there are many: from Romania and Bulgaria in the Balkans, to Cyprus and Greece in the eastern Mediterranean, to Egypt and the United Arab Emirates among the Arab states.
Israel lost an important strategic partner when Erdogan altered the course of Turkey’s foreign policy in the first decade of this century. But rather than throwing up its hands and yelling “gevalt!” Jerusalem found ways to make up for what it lost in losing Turkey by allying with other countries in the neighborhood.
Those alliances must now not be jeopardized just because Erdogan today deems it in his interest to have better relations with the Jewish state – which he has made clear time and time again that he actually loathes.
The Turkish media played up the phone call with Herzog as an effort to restart ties with the advent of the new leadership in Jerusalem.
But here is the hard truth about Israel-Turkey ties: A true reboot of the relationship will only come about when Turkey finally gets a new leader, not when Israel does. And even when that day comes, it will take time to rebuild the trust because Erdogan has succeeded – through his constant demonization of Israel – in turning many of his countrymen against the Jewish state.
拜登在也門的戰略：縮編和外交——分析
總統並沒有採取紅線政策和追究沙特阿拉伯的責任，而是一直試圖在不搖擺不定的情況下推進他的平台。
作者：勞倫摩根貝瑟
2021 年 7 月 13 日 17:13


2021 年 7 月 8 日，美國總統喬拜登在美國華盛頓白宮東廳發表講話，就政府在阿富汗的持續縮編努力發表講話時指指點點。
（照片來源：伊芙琳·霍克斯坦/路透社）
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在美國總統喬·拜登2021 年 2 月 4 日的首次外交政策演講中，他戲劇性地宣布他將終止美國對也門戰爭中“進攻性行動”的支持。拜登的決定似乎標誌著他的兩位前任的一個轉折點，他們幫助支持沙特領導的聯盟在也門打擊胡塞武裝。
伊朗支持的胡塞叛軍與沙特領導的聯盟之間在也門發動的戰爭進入了第七個年頭。2014 年，在胡塞武裝控制首都薩那後，胡塞武裝與軟弱的也門政府之間開始了戰鬥。作為回應，沙特阿拉伯和其他八個得到美國、英國和法國支持的阿拉伯國家發起了一場以空襲為中心的運動。
2015 年，在伊朗核協議談判期間，前總統巴拉克奧巴馬為沙特阿拉伯的聯盟開綠燈，包括提供軍事支持，部分抵消了該國對該協議的強烈反對。特朗普政府繼續提供這種支持，作為專注於強大的美沙關係的更廣泛戰略的一部分。
然而，在上任之前，拜登發起了一場運動，重點是限制對沙特人的無條件支持，包括增加對侵犯人權行為的問責，並“讓 [ing] 他們實際上成為他們的賤民”。
自上任以來，拜登似乎已經從這個職位上退了一步。總統並沒有採取紅線政策和追究沙特阿拉伯的責任，而是一直試圖在不搖擺不定的情況下推進他的平台。他的戰略在於製定更廣泛的政策，在不失去包括沙特阿拉伯在內的該地區主要盟友的情況下，平衡他希望減少美國在中東的參與。
例如，華盛頓自 4 月以來一直在從海灣地區拆除愛國者反導彈電池，包括從沙特阿拉伯的蘇丹王子空軍基地拆除，這是美國削減該地區部隊的更廣泛戰略的一部分。
與此同時，為了抵消這種脫離接觸的一些影響，拜登一直在向沙特人發出信號，表明美國仍然重視與他們的伙伴關係。即使在今年早些時候發布將王儲穆罕默德·本·薩勒曼與沙特記者賈馬爾·卡舒吉謀殺案聯繫起來的報告之後，政府的反應仍然很平靜。
“我們已經從重新校準的角度討論過這個問題。這不是破裂，”美國國務院發言人內德·普萊斯在 3 月份關於殺戮事件的報告出來後談到美國與沙特的關係時說。
這種“重新調整”的一部分在於邀請沙特高級官員到華盛頓等舉措。上週，王儲的兄弟、國防部副部長哈立德·本·薩勒曼親王訪問了美國首都，談論也門和伊朗的威脅，但重要的是，儘管哈立德參與了掩蓋事件，但他並未討論卡舒吉謀殺案.
2018 年 10 月 25 日，一名示威者在土耳其伊斯坦布爾的沙特阿拉伯領事館外舉著一張帶有沙特記者賈馬爾·卡舒吉照片的海報。（圖片來源：REUTERS/OSMAN ORSAL）
也門的戰爭遵循類似的模式。拜登的政策在於依靠外交和軍事削減，以期最終退出衝突。
這一戰略的第一部分在於他在 2 月份宣布停止對進攻性行動的支持。這包括阻止向沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯聯合酋長國出售包括精確制導彈藥在內的武器，直接反對前總統唐納德特朗普在該國的政策，該政策的特點是支持沙特領導的聯盟。
支持這種行動的人表示，這是姍姍來遲，向沙特發出了一個重要信號。但批評者，包括國會中的進步民主黨人，表示尚不清楚“進攻性行動”是什麼。2月24日，約41名國會議員致信拜登，支持退出，並要求澄清措辭；政府的反應是沉默的。
這種對“進攻性行動”的限制並不一定意味著美國不再支持沙特領導的聯盟。例如，美國軍隊仍在幫助為沙特飛機提供服務，以保持戰機在空中，支持該王國戰略的一個關鍵要素。
該戰略的下一個分支在於加強外交。拜登本人說：“我們也在加強外交以結束也門戰爭——這場戰爭造成了人道主義和戰略災難。我已要求我的中東團隊確保我們支持聯合國牽頭的實施停火、開放人道主義渠道和恢復長期擱置的和平談判的倡議。
為支持這一目標，拜登任命蒂姆·蘭德金為美國駐也門特使，這是自戰爭開始以來第一個擔任該職位的特使。
Lenderking 上任以來的主要戰略在於專注於區域參與者，包括該地區的巡迴演出。近日，他於6月4日前往沙特、約旦、阿曼和阿聯酋會見高級官員和也門人，討論危機，並於6月18日返回沙特阿拉伯。
美國對胡塞武裝的態度也發生了變化。2 月，國務卿安東尼·布林肯 (Antony Blinken) 撤銷了胡塞武裝——其口號是“美國之死，以色列之死，詛咒猶太人，伊斯蘭的勝利”——被列為恐怖組織，從而扭轉了特朗普政府的決定。6 月 25 日，Lenderking 描述了這一舉動：“美國承認他們是合法行為者。沒有人可以希望他們離開或脫離衝突，所以讓我們處理實地存在的現實。”
對胡塞武裝的這種承認可能是為了增加與該組織的外交渠道，以試圖達成協議以結束衝突。但到目前為止，Lenderking 和胡塞武裝之間仍然沒有直接對話。
但拜登的策略奏效了嗎？到目前為止，不是真的。針對拜登的行動，胡塞武裝只是升級了他們的行動，包括加強對沙特阿拉伯的無人機和導彈襲擊，以及在也門境內擴張領土。外交手段並未取得成效，因為胡塞武裝既拒絕了沙特阿拉伯的停火提議，也拒絕了讓步的提議，例如放寬對荷台達港的限制和向某些目的地開放薩那機場，此外還拒絕了單獨的美國停火計劃.
胡塞武裝還加大了對北部石油資源豐富的馬里布省的攻勢，該省是國際公認政府的中心。馬里布是一個重要的戰略要地，因為它是也門國民軍在北部的最後一個據點，也是通往南部的門戶，被政府和南部過渡委員會分開，為胡塞武裝利用他們的分裂提供了機會。
作為回應，5 月 20 日，拜登政府對領導馬里布襲擊的兩名主要軍事官員實施制裁，希望阻止該組織繼續推進。然而，進攻並沒有被阻止。
華盛頓近東政策研究所魯賓家族研究員埃拉娜·德洛齊爾 (E​​lana DeLozier) 表示，“最近結束戰爭的國際政治意願似乎反而增強了胡塞對其談判立場的看法。” 拜登政策的批評者還強調，美國在其外交戰略中正在失去對胡塞武裝的影響力。許多人還指出，伊朗不希望胡塞武裝讓步，以便在潛在的核談判中保持影響力。
目前看來，也門的戰爭還沒有結束。隨著僵局的持續，衝突的輸家是也門人民，他們在世界上最大的人道主義災難之一中遭受廣泛的營養不良和疾病。拜登目前的戰略似乎並未結束衝突，這引發了一個問題：也門的戰​​爭會結束嗎？
Biden’s strategy in Yemen: Drawdowns and diplomacy - analysis
Instead of a policy of redlines and holding Saudi Arabia accountable, the president has been trying to advance his platform without rocking the boat.
By LAUREN MORGANBESSER
JULY 13, 2021 17:13


US President Joe Biden points a finger as he delivers remarks on the administration's continued drawdown efforts in Afghanistan in a speech from the East Room at the White House in Washington US, July 8, 2021.
(photo credit: EVELYN HOCKSTEIN/REUTERS)
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In US President Joe Biden’s first foreign policy speech on February 4, 2021, he dramatically announced that he would be ending US support for “offensive operations” in the war in Yemen. Biden’s decision appeared to mark a turning point from his two predecessors, who helped support the Saudi-led coalition against Houthi forces in Yemen.
The war in Yemen, waged between the Iranian-backed Houthi rebel forces and a Saudi-led coalition, is entering its seventh year. Fighting started in 2014 between the Houthis and the weak Yemeni government after the Houthis took control of the capital Sanaa. In response, Saudi Arabia and eight other Arab states backed by the US, UK and France started a campaign centered around airstrikes.
In 2015, amid the negotiations over the Iran nuclear deal, former president Barack Obama gave a green light to Saudi Arabia’s coalition, including providing military support, partially to offset the kingdom’s strong opposition to the deal. The Trump administration continued such support as a part of a broader strategy focusing on strong US-Saudi ties.
However, before coming to office, Biden ran on a campaign focused on limiting unconditional support to the Saudis, including increasing accountability for human rights abuses and “mak[ing] them in fact the pariah that they are.”
Since coming to office, Biden appears to have taken a step back from this position. Instead of a policy of redlines and holding Saudi Arabia accountable, the president has been trying to advance his platform without rocking the boat. His strategy lies in a broader policy of balancing his desired reduction of US involvement in the Middle East without losing key allies in the region, including Saudi Arabia.
For example, Washington has been removing Patriot antimissile batteries from the Gulf since April, including from Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, part of a broader strategy of US reduction of forces in the region.
At the same time, to offset some of the fallout from such disengagement, Biden has been signaling to the Saudis that the US still values a partnership with them. Even after the report came out earlier this year linking Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the response from the administration was muted.
“We’ve talked about this in terms of a recalibration. It’s not a rupture,” State Department spokesman Ned Price said of the US-Saudi relationship in March, after the report on the killing came out.
Part of this “recalibration” lies in moves like inviting top Saudi officials to Washington. Last week, Deputy Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, brother of the crown prince, visited the US capital to talk about Yemen and threats from Iran but, significantly, did not discuss the Khashoggi murder even though Khalid was reportedly involved in the cover-up.
THE WAR in Yemen follows a similar pattern. Biden’s policy lies in relying on diplomacy and military reductions, in hopes of an eventual withdrawal from the conflict.
The first part of this strategy lies in his announcement in February of halting support to offensive operations. This included blocking arms sales, including precision-guided munitions to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, in direct opposition to former president Donald Trump’s policy in the country, which was marked by support for the Saudi-led coalition.
Those who supported such an action said it was long overdue and that it sent an important signal to the Saudis. But critics, including progressive democrats in Congress, say it is unclear what “offensive operations are.” On February 24, some 41 members of Congress sent a letter to Biden supporting the withdrawal and asking for clarification on the language; the administration’s response was muted.
Such limits on “offensive operations” do not necessarily mean that the US no longer supports the Saudi-led coalition. For example, US forces still helping service Saudi aircraft to keep the warplanes in the air, backing a key element of the kingdom’s strategy.
The next prong of the strategy lies in increased diplomacy. Biden himself said: “We’re also stepping up our diplomacy to end the war in Yemen – a war which has created a humanitarian and strategic catastrophe. I’ve asked my Middle East team to ensure our support for the United Nations-led initiative to impose a ceasefire, open humanitarian channels and restore long-dormant peace talks.
In support of this goal, Biden appointed Tim Lenderking as the US special envoy to Yemen, the first one filling that position since the war started.
Lenderking’s main strategy since assuming the post lies in focusing on regional players, including tours of the region. Recently, on June 4, he went to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Oman and the UAE to meet with senior officials and Yemenis to discuss the crisis, as well as returning to Saudi Arabia on June 18.
AMERICA’S TONE toward the Houthis has also changed. In February, Secretary of State Antony Blinken revoked the Houthis – whose slogan is “death to America, death to Israel, curse the Jews, and victory for Islam” – from being classified as a terrorist organization, reversing the Trump administration’s decision. On June 25, Lenderking described the move: "The United States recognizes them as a legitimate actor. No one can wish them away or out of the conflict, so let's deal with realities that exist on the ground.”
Such recognition of the Houthis is likely intended to increase diplomatic channels with the group in an attempt to reach an agreement to end the conflict. But there have still been no direct talks so far between Lenderking and the Houthis.
But has Biden’s strategy worked? So far, not really. In response to Biden’s actions, the Houthis have only escalated their campaign, including intensified drone and missile attacks on Saudi Arabia, as well as territorial expansion inside of Yemen. Diplomatic approaches have not proved fruitful, as the Houthis have rejected both Saudi Arabia’s offer of a ceasefire as well as offers of concessions, such as easing restrictions on Hodeida Port and opening Sanaa airport to some destinations, in addition to rejecting a separate US ceasefire plan.
The Houthis have also increased their offensive against the oil-rich Marib province in the North, which is the center of the internationally recognized government. Marib is an important strategic location, as it is the Yemen National Army’s last stronghold in the North and a gateway to the South, which is divided between the government and the Southern Transitional Council, providing an opportunity for the Houthis to capitalize on their disunity.
In response, on May 20, the Biden administration imposed sanctions on two key military officials leading the Marib attack, hoping to deter the group from continuing their advance. However, the offensive was undeterred.
According to Elana DeLozier, the Rubin Family Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “the recent uptick in international political will to end the war seems instead to have emboldened Houthi perceptions of their negotiating position.” Critics of Biden’s policy also emphasize that the US is losing leverage over the Houthis in their diplomatic strategy. Many also point out that Iran does not want the Houthis to back down, so that it can keep leverage in potential nuclear talks.
For the time being, it appears that the war in Yemen is not coming to an end. As the stalemate drags on, the losers of the conflict are the Yemeni people, who suffer from widespread malnutrition and disease in one of the greatest humanitarian disasters in the world. Biden’s strategy for now does not appear to be ending the conflict, prompting the question: Will the war in Yemen ever end?
以色列希望向加沙提供外援的憑證系統
“卡塔爾用於加沙的錢不會作為裝滿美元的手提箱進入哈馬斯。”
通過LAHAV哈爾科夫，路透
2021 年 7 月 13 日 20:07


在路透社於 2021 年 5 月 23 日獲得的這張講義圖片中，可以在埃及和加沙地帶之間的拉法過境點看到一輛載有埃及萬歲基金發送的物資的援助車隊的卡車。
（圖片來源：埃及總統/通過路透社的講義）
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以色列公共安全部長 Omer Bar Lev 週二表示，以色列正在考慮向加沙支付外援的憑證系統，以防止捐款被轉用於支持巴勒斯坦飛地的哈馬斯統治者及其軍火庫。
總理納夫塔利·貝內特（Naftali Bennett）設想了“一種機制，其中的內容實質上將是食品券或人道主義援助券，而不是可用於開髮用於對抗以色列國的武器的現金，”巴列夫告訴陸軍電台。
巴爾列夫不排除卡塔爾繼續捐款的可能性，並提出了歐盟援助的可能性。
“卡塔爾為加沙提供的資金不會作為裝滿美元的手提箱進入哈馬斯，哈馬斯本質上是哈馬斯自己及其官員的重要組成部分，”部長補充說，呼應了貝內特最近的聲明。
“如果機制是這樣，我毫不懷疑以色列會幫助改善加沙地帶的人道主義局勢，”他說。
在 5 月份的 11 天跨境戰鬥之後，人道主義機構將貧困的加沙地帶的最新重建費用定為 5 億美元。
在 2014 年保護邊緣行動之後，卡塔爾為加沙的建築和其他項目提供了價值超過 10 億美元的資金，其中一些是現金。這些付款得到以色列的監督和批准，多哈在今年 5 月底承諾再提供 5 億美元。
一位接近貝內特的消息人士表示，重建加沙的資金必須通過聯合國分配，而代金券系統是他們正在考慮的一個選擇。以色列還沒有決定是否會同意聯合國巴勒斯坦難民機構近東救濟工程處或其他與哈馬斯合作歷史較少的機構提供援助。
“我們正在尋找聯合國充當中間人，”消息人士說。“我們希望對正在發生的事情進行記錄和監督。這不會是完美的，但總比將無法追踪的賬單發送到加沙而不知道發生了什麼事要好。”
哈馬斯沒有立即發表評論。
無法立即聯繫到卡塔爾駐加沙援助特使穆罕默德·艾瑪迪 (Mohammed al-Emadi) 置評。
一名巴勒斯坦官員告訴路透社：“一切都還沒有定論。”
歐盟、美國等一些國家已將哈馬斯列為恐怖組織。
美國國務院發言人內德·普賴斯上週表示，美國“致力於為巴勒斯坦人民提供他們在最近的暴力事件之後需要的人道主義援助，但由於多年的管理不善、忽視和哈馬斯的虐待。 ，事實上的管理當局。”
當被問及美國是否會通過聯合國向加沙提供援助時，普萊斯回答說：“很清楚的是，美國的資金不會流向哈馬斯，我們將與合作夥伴合作，確保資金得到有效分配。”
Israel wants voucher system for foreign aid to Gaza
"The Qatari money for Gaza will not go in as suitcases full of dollars which end up with Hamas."
By LAHAV HARKOV, REUTERS
JULY 13, 2021 20:07


An aid convoy's trucks loaded with supplies send by Long Live Egypt Fund are seen at the Rafah border crossing between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, in this handout picture obtained by Reuters on May 23, 2021.
(photo credit: THE EGYPTIAN PRESIDENCY/HANDOUT VIA REUTERS)
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Israel is considering a voucher system for foreign aid to be disbursed to Gaza, as a safeguard against donations being diverted to bolster the Palestinian enclave's Hamas rulers and their arsenal, Public Security Minister Omer Bar Lev said on Tuesday.
Prime Minister Naftali Bennett envisaged "a mechanism where what will go in, in essence, would be food vouchers, or vouchers for humanitarian aid, and not cash that can be taken and used for developing weaponry to be wielded against the State of Israel,” Bar Lev told Army Radio.
Bar Lev did not rule out continued donations from Qatar, and raised a possibility of European Union assistance.
"The Qatari money for Gaza will not go in as suitcases full of dollars which end up with Hamas, where Hamas in essence takes for itself and its officials a significant part of it," the minister added, echoing recent statements by Bennett.
"Should the mechanism be like this, I have no doubt that Israel would help in the improvement of the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip," he said.



Humanitarian agencies put the latest
reconstruction costs for the impoverished Gaza Strip at $500 million following 11 days of cross-border fighting in May.
Qatar bankrolled more than $1 billion worth of construction and other projects in Gaza, some of it in cash, after Operation Protective Edge in 2014. The payments were monitored and approved by Israel, and Doha pledged another $500 million in late May of this year.
A source close to Bennett said the funds to rebuild Gaza must be distributed via the UN and a voucher system is one option that they are considering. Israel also has yet to decide whether it would agree to UNRWA, the UN agency for Palestinian refugees, to delivery the aid, or another agency that has less of a history of working with Hamas.
“We are looking for the UN to be the middle man,” the source said. “We want documentation and supervision of what’s happening. It won’t be perfect, but it’s better than sending untraceable bills into Gaza and not knowing what’s going on.”
Hamas did not immediately comment.
Mohammed al-Emadi, the Qatari aid envoy to Gaza, could not immediately be reached for comment.
A Palestinian official told Reuters: "Nothing is final yet."
The EU, United States and some other countries have designated Hamas as a terrorist organization.
US State Department spokesperson Ned Price said last week that the US is "committed to providing the Palestinian people with the humanitarian assistance that they need both in the aftermath of the most recent violence, but from years of mismanagement, of neglect, of abuse by Hamas, the de facto governing authority."
Asked if the US will send aid to Gaza via the UN, Price responded: "What is what is very clear is that US funds will not be going to Hamas, and we will work with partners to see that it’s distributed effectively."
以色列國防軍、辛貝特、甘茨不願因恐怖主義津貼而扣押巴勒斯坦權力機構稅——報告
瓦拉表示，儘管最終決定通過了，但安全官員警告說，現在不是對巴勒斯坦權力機構造成經濟打擊的好時機。
由TOI 工作人員提供今天，晚上 8:58


國防部長本尼·甘茨出席在以色列南部埃什科爾地區舉行的會議。2021 年 7 月 13 日。（Flash90）
國防部長本尼甘茨、交通部長梅拉夫米凱利和衛生部長尼贊霍洛維茨都對安全內閣決定從巴勒斯坦權力機構扣留數億謝克爾以抵消其支付給恐怖分子及其家人的資金持保留態度，瓦拉新聞網站週二報導。
報導稱，部長們的立場與軍方和辛貝特的立場一致。
安全內閣最終決定在周日從巴勒斯坦權力機構扣押近 6 億新謝克爾（1.83 億美元），用於支付過去一年支付的資金。
據報導，由於巴勒斯坦權力機構已經面臨金融衝突，三位部長對此舉的時機感到擔憂。
該網站援引兩名熟悉內閣會議事件的未具名高級官員的話說，軍方與巴勒斯坦人的主要聯絡人、領土政府活動協調員 (COGAT) 少將加桑·阿利安 (Ghassan Alian) 警告不要預扣稅款，並向部長們表示，2019 年的類似抵消尚未完成。
Alian 解釋說，PA 需要現金，同時承擔 2019 年和 2020 年的稅收對管理局來說將是沉重的打擊，儘管不是淘汰賽。據 Walla 報導，Shin Bet 的代表支持 Alian 的立場和他的擔憂，建議將行動推遲到以後的某個日期。
藍白黨的甘茨支持 COGAT 負責人的立場，並表示支持延期。工黨的米凱利和梅雷茨的霍洛維茨也支持推遲，指出削弱巴勒斯坦權力機構不利於以色列的利益。


2021 年 7 月 12 日，梅雷茨黨衛生部長尼贊·霍洛維茨（Nitzan Horowitz）左翼在耶路撒冷議會主持梅雷茨派別會議。（Olivier Fitoussi/Flash90）
隨後在會議期間，以色列國防軍代表介紹了有關由哈馬斯恐怖組織統治的加沙地帶的政策。
廣告
有人提出了削弱致力於摧毀以色列的哈馬斯的方法的建議，以支持與以色列有合作協議的巴勒斯坦權力機構。邁克爾和霍洛維茨隨後指出，建議的政策與預扣稅的計劃相矛盾，這會削弱巴勒斯坦權力機構。
據報導，關於預扣巴勒斯坦權力機構稅的討論只持續了幾分鐘，並沒有激烈進行，儘管這是自上個月新政府成立以來，聯盟夥伴首次在對巴勒斯坦人的政策上出