本集介紹

2021.07.04 國際新聞導讀-美國眾院批准給以色列33億美元額外軍事援助，也給約旦16億美元，埃及為新成立的7月3日海軍基地揭幕、亞伯拉罕協議為區域帶來新契機、納唐雅胡兒子開始代父出征抹黑現政府

眾議院撥款委員會批准向以色列安全部門撥款 33 億美元
委員會還批准了 Nita M. Lowey 中東和平夥伴關係法案經濟支持基金下的 5000 萬美元。
由OMRI NAHMIAS
2021 年 7 月 3 日 19:49
眾議院議長南希佩洛西（D-CA）在國會重新召開眾議院會議時發表講話，於 2021 年 1 月 6 日在美國華盛頓的美國國會大廈辯論亞利桑那州對選舉團投票的認證
（圖片來源：AMANDA VOISARD/POOL VIA REUTERS）
廣告
華盛頓——眾議院撥款委員會周四批准了 2022 年國家和對外行動財政法案，其中包括美國對以色列的 33 億美元安全援助，正如 2016 年諒解備忘錄 (MOU) 所同意的那樣。
美國以色列公共事務委員會（AIPAC）在推特上說：“該委員會的撥款，在沒有附加政治條件的情況下，反映了兩黨 在國會和拜登政府中對以色列安全的堅定承諾 。”
該委員會還在 Nita M. Lowey 中東和平夥伴關係法案的經濟支持基金下批准了 5000 萬美元，“以繼續急需的人與人之間的計劃以及以色列人和巴勒斯坦人之間的聯合經濟夥伴關係。”
額外的 200 萬美元。將協助美國國際開發署-以色列國際發展合作“支持當地解決方案，以應對與水資源、農業和能源儲存相關的可持續性挑戰。”
該法案還為聯合國人權理事會恢復了資金，“除非國務卿確定並向撥款委員會報告參與該理事會不符合美國的國家利益，並且該理事會沒有採取重大行動按照本節報告的指示，採取措施將以色列取消為永久議程項目，或採取行動確保選舉此類理事會成員的完整性。”
“委員會失望地註意到人權記錄不佳的國家加入聯合國人權理事會，因此敦促國務卿和美國駐聯合國大使在理事會中發揮美國新的影響力，大力推動其他國家維護人權，尊重法治，尊重公民，”隨附的報告中寫道。“委員會還關注聯合國人權理事會對以色列及其反以色列偏見的持續、不成比例的關注。”
該法案指示國務卿“向撥款委員會提交一份年度報告，描述聯合國反以色列偏見的實例，包括確定過去曾表現出這種偏見的機構和實體。”
該委員會還指出，它“關注國際社會通過抵制、撤資和製裁（BDS）運動來污名化和孤立以色列的努力。”
“作為向國會提交的關於抵制以色列的阿拉伯聯盟年度報告的一部分，委員會指示總統添加有關 BDS 活動的信息，涵蓋公司、國際組織、國家和其他組織，包括國家投資工具，參與推動該運動的人，以及國務院已經採取並預計將採取的具體步驟，以阻止或結束出於政治動機的抵制、撤資或製裁以色列或以色列實體的努力，”報告寫道。
“委員會進一步指示國務卿和美國國際開發署署長加強政策和程序，以確保通過資金支持的組織不會參與此類努力。”
報告還“重申了兩黨長期以來對以巴衝突的兩國解決方案的支持，並指出通過談判達成的兩國解決方案對於實現以色列的民主猶太國和可行、民主的目標至關重要。巴勒斯坦國在和平、安全和相互承認中毗鄰共存。”
“委員會仍然對缺乏直接談判感到關切，並敦促雙方不要採取單邊行動，這會危及對話和回到談判桌的機會，或最終實現兩國解決方案的機會，”它寫道。“這包括巴勒斯坦煽動暴力和尋求承認作為一個國家和國際組織的成員資格，而不是通過談判實現兩國解決方案。這還包括以色列在雙方談判達成的協議之外的吞併或定居點擴張。”
該 committe Ë建議包括$225米。為西岸和加沙的巴勒斯坦人民提供人道主義和發展援助的經濟支持基金。
該法案還將提供 $1.6b。為約旦提供援助，包括 $1.2b。根據經濟支持基金和 4.25 億美元。根據外國軍事融資計劃。
“委員會注意到與約旦王國關係的重要性以及約旦在促進該地區和平與穩定方面繼續發揮的強大領導作用，”隨附的報告中寫道。
House Appropriations Committee approves $3.3 billion to Israel security
The Committee also approved $50 million under the Economic Support Fund for the Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act.
By OMRI NAHMIAS
JULY 3, 2021 19:49

House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) speaks as Congress reconvenes in the House chamber to debate Arizona's certification of electoral college votes at the US Capitol in Washington, US, January 6, 2021
(photo credit: AMANDA VOISARD/POOL VIA REUTERS)
WASHINGTON – The House Appropriations Committee approved on Thursday the 2022 State and Foreign Operation fiscal bill, including $3.3 billion in US security assistance to Israel, as agreed to in the 2016 memorandum of understanding (MOU).
The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), tweeted that “the committee’s appropriation, with no added political conditions, reflects the strong bipartisan commitment for Israel’s security in Congress and the Biden administration.”
The committee also approved $50 million under the Economic Support Fund for the Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act, “to continue critically needed people-to-people programming and joint economic partnerships between Israelis and Palestinians.”
An additional amount of $2m. would assist USAID-Israel international development cooperation “to support local solutions to address sustainability challenges relating to water resources, agriculture, and energy storage.”
The bill also restores funds for the United Nations Human Rights Council, “unless the secretary of state determines and reports to the Committees on Appropriations that participation in the council does not serve the national interest of the United States and that the council is not taking significant steps to remove Israel as a permanent agenda item nor taking actions to ensure integrity in the election of members to such council as directed under reports in this section.”
“The committee notes with disappointment the ascension to UNHRC of countries with poor human rights records, and therefore urges the secretary of state and the United States ambassador to the United Nations to exercise the renewed influence of the United States in the Council to vigorously press other countries to uphold human rights, respect the rule of law, and treat their citizens with dignity,” the accompanying report reads. “The committee is also concerned with the continued, disproportionate focus of UNHRC on Israel and its anti-Israel bias.”
The bill directs the secretary of state “to submit an annual report to the Committees on Appropriations describing instances of anti-Israel bias at the United Nations, including an identification of the agencies and entities where such bias has been demonstrated in the past.”
The committee also noted that it is “concerned about international efforts to stigmatize and isolate Israel through the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement.”
“The committee directs, as part of the annual report to Congress on the Arab League Boycott of Israel, that the president add information about the BDS campaign, covering companies, international organizations, countries, and other organizations, including state investment vehicles, that are involved in promoting the movement, as well as specific steps the Department of State has taken and expects to take to discourage or end politically-motivated efforts to boycott, divest from, or sanction Israel or Israeli entities,” the report reads.
“The committee further directs the secretary of state and [the] USAID administrator to strengthen policies and procedures to ensure organizations supported through funding are not participants in such efforts.”
The report also “reaffirms the longstanding, bipartisan support for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and notes that a negotiated two-state solution is essential to achieving the goal of a democratic Jewish State of Israel and a viable, democratic Palestinian state living side-by-side in peace, security, and mutual recognition.”
“The committee remains concerned by the absence of direct negotiations and urges both sides to refrain from engaging in unilateral action that jeopardizes the chances for dialogue and returning to the negotiating table, or of eventual achievement of a two-state solution,” it reads. “This includes Palestinian incitement of violence and pursuing recognition as a state and membership in international organizations in lieu of achieving a two-state solution through negotiations. This also includes Israeli annexation or settlement expansion outside of an agreement negotiated between the two sides.”
The committee recommendation includes $225m. under the Economic Support Fund for humanitarian and development assistance for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza.
The bill would also provide $1.6b. in assistance for Jordan, including $1.2b. under the Economic Support Fund and $425m. under the Foreign Military Financing Program.
“The committee notes the importance of the relationship with the Kingdom of Jordan and the strong leadership that Jordan continues to play in advancing peace and stability in the region,” the accompanying report reads.
伊朗擔心拜登在中東的下一步行動
伊朗認為美國正在尋求避免軍事衝突。這將減少美國加強其存在的機會。
作者：SETH J. FRANZMAN
2021 年 7 月 4 日 00:23

美國總統喬拜登和副總統卡馬拉哈里斯 3 月在佐治亞州亞特蘭大的埃默里大學會見亞裔美國領導人後發表講話。
（照片來源：卡洛斯·巴里亞/路透社）
廣告
伊朗的 Tasnim 新聞有一篇有趣的文章，討論了對美國總統喬拜登在中東的下一步行動的擔憂。伊朗一直在關注美國從阿富汗撤軍，並希望美國從其他地方撤軍。不過，伊朗資深分析人士似乎認為，美國不會繼續撤軍，而是會找理由留在伊拉克、敘利亞等地。
伊朗對拜登如何看待敘利亞和美國在伊拉克的軍事存在深感興趣。“他們以[這些部隊]威脅美軍為藉口，將目標對準兩國邊境的敘利亞和伊拉克部隊。毫無疑問，這些侵略與打擊恐怖主義之間沒有聯繫，”塔斯尼姆說。
這位分析人士認為，美國針對的組織正在打擊“恐怖主義”。這是因為伊朗政權聲稱伊拉克和伊朗的親伊朗民兵正在與聖戰組織作戰。親伊朗的評論員提出的陰謀論普遍聲稱美國支持針對伊朗的“恐怖分子”，美國祇是假裝與伊斯蘭國這樣的組織作戰。“任何真正尋求真相的人都非常清楚，正是美國在傳播恐怖主義，並依靠恐怖組織為其在該地區的軍事存在和對伊拉克和敘利亞的佔領辯護。” 這當然是無稽之談。美國於 2011 年離開伊拉克，直到 2014 年應巴格達的邀請才返回幫助打擊伊斯蘭國。美國空軍和特種部隊是擊敗伊斯蘭國的關鍵。在拉卡擊敗伊斯蘭國的不是伊朗，而是美國支持的自衛隊。伊朗幫助擊敗了伊斯蘭國，
伊朗意識到美國最近更加關注中國。然而，伊朗想知道美國將在中東做什麼。“對此，可以說，從美國在該地區的行為，可以得出結論，該國正在策劃影響該地區的新戰略：從阿富汗撤軍的模糊決定，關於軍事的模糊聲明。從伊拉克撤軍、結束也門戰爭的模糊和徒勞的要求，以及最終根據第2254號決議在不繞過敘利亞合法政府的情況下解決敘利亞問題的模棱兩可的要求，包括相互矛盾的行為。”
伊朗的分析人士說，不能相信美國會真正撤軍。“為什麼美國人願意撤離具有重要全球作用的中東戰略地區，並將其交給美國最強大的競爭對手俄羅斯？” 這是一個很好的問題，許多擔心美國前政府急於撤軍的人想知道這是否會賦予俄羅斯權力。
伊朗認為美國正在尋求避免軍事衝突。這將減少美國加強其存在的機會。這位分析師認為，美國現在的目標是“與美國附屬國家的軍隊建立密切聯繫，控制他們的決策和行動，使其軍隊成為美國在中東政策的替代品”。他以黎巴嫩為例。在人道主義目標的幌子下，美國的目標是在軍隊和黎巴嫩抵抗運動 [真主黨] 之間製造裂痕，以便隨著時間的推移，黎巴嫩軍隊將受到美國的直接控制，猶太復國主義政權將能夠實現其目標。在未來可能與真主黨開戰時，更容易在黎巴嫩實現目標。” 這種陰謀論很可能代表伊朗對美國關於黎巴嫩的討論的看法，並意味著美國在那裡的任何角色，甚至向黎巴嫩軍隊扔錢，也會受到懷疑。塔斯尼姆指出，真主黨的哈桑·納斯魯拉提到了這一“美國的陰謀……納斯魯拉保證，這些美國與猶太復國主義的陰謀不會成功，軍隊和真主黨不會落入華盛頓的陷阱。”
接下來，文章著眼於親伊朗團體最近對駐敘利亞美軍的襲擊。這是在美國下令轟炸阿爾布卡邁勒的親伊朗團體以應對無人機襲擊之後發生的。這表明可能會出現更多攻擊。作者認為，美國想要阻止該地區的穩定。“美國需要防止地區不穩定和製造混亂以鞏固其對中東的佔領，這需要恐怖組織在中東的存在……我們不應期望美國決定停止支持ISIS 或其他恐怖組織，或向土耳其施壓，要求其停止對恐怖主義的支持；也不可能切斷美國對敘利亞‘民主’民兵的支持。” 這是美國對敘利亞民主力量的支持，該組織起源於 2015 年與美國合作的與 ISIS 作戰的庫爾德組織。特朗普領導下的美國政府還尋求與土耳其和伊德利卜土耳其支持的極端分子進行更密切的合作。
在這方面，伊朗分析家是正確的。美國前政府確實尋求支持土耳其支持的極端分子。華盛頓錯誤地認為這些團體會與阿薩德政權和伊朗作戰，但土耳其卻利用它們對阿夫林和其他地方的庫爾德人進行種族清洗。
分析師的結論是美國不會離開該地區。“與普遍看法相反，”他認為美國不會離開。有專家認為，美國近期從阿富汗撤軍，或從沙特、伊拉克等幾個阿拉伯國家撤出反導系統等美國行動，意味著華盛頓從中東撤軍。不要接受這個想法。”
事實上，文章稱美國現階段缺乏對該地區的全面戰略。“然而，可以肯定的是，在反對伊拉克驅逐美國人的國家決定的背景下，美國占領軍與伊拉克抵抗組織（親伊朗）之間的對抗升級。美國人還試圖阻止敘利亞與伊拉克在抵抗軸上的關係得到加強。” 分析人士認為，美國對伊拉克與伊朗的密切關係以及伊朗利用伊拉克支持巴勒斯坦團體和打擊以色列感到擔憂。
美國有哪些選擇。塔斯尼姆的解釋是，美國可以在該地區發動一場新的戰爭，但這代價高昂。報告指出，伊朗支持的“抵抗”迫使美國在 2011 年離開伊拉克。“第二種選擇是華盛頓決定撤退，因為擔心參與代價高昂的戰爭，這將意味著美國信譽的崩潰。最終可以說，如果美國選擇這兩種選擇中的任何一種，就意味著它的失敗，而這種失敗的後果也將落在猶太復國主義佔領者和妥協的阿拉伯政權的頭上，這些政權的存在取決於美國的支持。 ”
簡而言之，伊朗認為無論哪種方式，美國都面臨著將死的局面。然而，文章顯示伊朗對其缺乏對拜登政府當前政策的了解感到擔憂。伊朗政權仔細研究了美國的政策思維和美國在該地區的作用。儘管伊朗提出陰謀來解釋美國的角色，但它往往了解支持美國決策的一些因素。
Iran concerned about Biden’s next Middle East moves
Iran thinks the US is seeking to avoid military conflicts. This would reduce the chance that the US would strengthen its presence.
By SETH J. FRANTZMAN
JULY 4, 2021 00:23
US PRESIDENT Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris speak after meeting with Asian-American leaders at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia, in March.
(photo credit: CARLOS BARRIA / REUTERS)
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Iran’s Tasnim news had an interesting article discussing concerns about US President Joe Biden’s next moves in the Middle East. Iran has been watching the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, and is hopeful the US might withdraw elsewhere. However, veteran analysts in Iran appear to think that the US will not continue the withdrawal and will instead find reasons to stay in Iraq, Syria and other places.
Iran is deeply interested in how Biden views Syria and the US military presence in Iraq. “They are targeting Syrian and Iraqi forces on the border between the two countries under the pretext of [those forces] threatening US troops. There is no doubt that there is no connection between these aggressions and the fight against terrorism,” Tasnim says.
The analyst argues that the groups targeted by the US were fighting “terrorism.” This is because Iran’s regime claims that pro-Iran militias in Iraq and Iran are fighting jihadist groups. The conspiracies put forward by pro-Iran commentators generally claim the US backs “terrorists” against Iran and that the US only pretends to fight groups like ISIS. “Anyone who really seeks the truth knows very well that it is the United States that spreads terrorism and relies on terrorist groups to justify its military presence in the region and its occupation of Iraq and Syria.” This is of course nonsense. The US left Iraq in 2011 and only returned in 2014 at the invitation of Baghdad to help fight ISIS. US airpower and special forces were key to defeating ISIS. It was not Iran that defeated ISIS in Raqqa, but the US-backed SDF. Iran helped defeat ISIS, but its claims that the US helped “terrorists” is not accurate.
Iran is aware that the US is focusing more on China these days. However Iran wonders what the US will do in the Middle East. “In this regard, it can be said that from the behavior of the United States in the region, it can be concluded that the country is planning a new strategy to influence the region: The ambiguous decision to withdraw from Afghanistan, ambiguous statements about military withdrawal from Iraq, vague and fruitless demands to end the Yemeni war, and finally the ambiguous request to resolve the Syrian issue in accordance with Resolution 2254 without bypassing the legitimate Syrian government, include contradictory behavior.”
Iran’s analyst says the US cannot be trusted to really withdraw troops. “Why are the Americans willing to evacuate the strategic Middle East region, which plays an important global role, and hand it over to Russia, America's most powerful rival?” This is a good question and many who were concerned about the former US administration’s rush to withdraw, wondered if it would empower Russia.
Iran thinks the US is seeking to avoid military conflicts. This would reduce the chance that the US would strengthen its presence. The US goal now is to “establish close ties with the armies of US-affiliated countries and control their decisions and actions so that their armies are a substitute for US policies in the Middle East,” the analyst argues. He points to Lebanon as an example. Under the guise of humanitarian goals the US will aim to create a “rift between the army and the Lebanese resistance [Hezbollah], so that over time the Lebanese army will be under direct US control, and the Zionist regime will be able to achieve its goals in Lebanon more easily in a possible future war with Hezbollah.” This conspiracy theory is likely representative of Iran’s view of US discussions about Lebanon and means that any US role there, even throwing money at the Lebanese army, will be viewed with suspicion. Tasnim notes that Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah has referred to this “American conspiracy…Nasrallah assured that these US-Zionist conspiracies would not be successful and that the army and Hezbollah would not fall into the trap of Washington.”
Next, the article looks at recent attacks by pro-Iran groups on US forces in Syria. This occurred after the US ordered bombing of pro-Iran groups in Albukamal in response to drone attacks. This indicates more attacks may follow. The author argues that the US wants to prevent stability in the region. “The United States needs to prevent instability in the region and create chaos in order to consolidate its occupation of the Middle East, this requires the presence of terrorist groups in the Middle East….We should not expect the United States to decide to stop supporting ISIS or other terrorist groups or to pressure Turkey to end its support for terrorism; It is also not possible to cut off US support for the ‘democratic’ militias in Syria.” This is a reference to the US support for the Syrian Democratic Forces, a group that grew out of Kurdish groups fighting ISIS in 2015 which the US partnered with. The US administration under Trump also sought closer work with Turkey and Turkish-backed extremists in Idlib.
On this aspect the Iranian analyst is correct. The former US administration did seek to support extremists, backed by Turkey. Washington wrongly thought those groups would fight the Assad regime and Iran, but instead Turkey used them to ethnically-cleanse Kurds in Afrin and other places.
The conclusion of the analyst is that the US is not leaving the region. “Contrary to popular belief,” he argues that the US is not leaving. “Some experts believe that recent US actions, such as the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan or the withdrawal of US anti-missile systems from several Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia and Iraq, mean Washington's military withdrawal from the Middle East. Do not accept this idea.”
In fact, the article claims the US lacks a comprehensive strategy for the region at this stage. “What is certain, however, is the escalation of the confrontation between the American occupying forces and the resistance [pro-Iran] groups in Iraq in the context of countering the national decision of this country to expel the Americans. The Americans are also trying to prevent the strengthening of Syrian-Iraqi relations on the axis of resistance.” The analyst believes that the US is concerned about Iraq’s close relations with Iran and Iran using Iraq to support Palestinians groups and strike at Israel.
What are the US options. Tasnim’s explanation is that the US could engage in a new war in the region but this would be costly. It notes that Iranian-backed “resistance” forced the US to leave Iraq in 2011. “The second option is for Washington to decide to retreat for fear of engaging in a costly war, which would mean the collapse of US credibility. In the end, it can be said that if the United States chooses either of these two options, it means defeat for it, and also the consequences of this defeat will befall the Zionist occupiers and the compromising Arab regimes whose existence depends on American support.”
In short, Iran thinks the US faces a checkmate scenario either way. However the article reveals that Iran is concerned about its lack of understanding of the Biden administration’s current policy. Iran’s regime has closely studied the US policy mindset and US role in the region. Despite the conspiracies Iran puts forward as explaining the US role, it tends to understand some of what underpins US decision making.
埃及塞西在利比亞邊境附近開設海軍基地
海軍部隊進行了包括發射火箭、跳傘和兩棲登陸在內的演習，塞西和他的客人們從其中一艘西北風的艦橋上觀看。
通過路透
2021 年 7 月 3 日 23:22
埃及總統阿卜杜勒·法塔赫·塞西於 2019 年出席在埃及伊斯梅利亞舉行的儀式
（照片來源：AMR ABDALLAH DALSH / 路透社）
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埃及總統阿卜杜勒·法塔赫·塞西周六在距利比亞邊境 135 公里的地方為一個海軍基地揭幕，其兩側是親密盟友阿布扎比王儲謝赫·穆罕默德·本·扎耶德·納哈揚和利比亞統一總統。
埃及表示，7 月 3 日的基地將有助於它保護戰略和經濟利益，並有助於防止非正常移民，因為它致力於加強其在地中海和紅海的海軍存在。
在就職典禮上，兩艘從法國購買的西北風直升機航母與一艘德國製造的潛艇和兩艘最近交付的 FREMM 級意大利護衛艦一起展出。
海軍部隊進行了包括發射火箭、跳傘和兩棲登陸在內的演習，塞西和他的客人在其中一艘西北風的艦橋上觀看。
7 月 3 日基地的名字標誌著 2013 年塞西在 2013 年領導推翻穆斯林兄弟會主席穆罕默德·穆爾西的日子，該基地佔地 10 多平方公里，擁有 1000 米長的海軍碼頭，水深為 14 米。它還有用於商業航運的碼頭。
隨著利比亞在 2011 年後陷入動盪，東部邊界一直是埃及的一個關鍵安全問題，儘管它加強了在該地區的存在。
埃及和阿拉伯聯合酋長國，謝赫穆罕默德是事實上的統治者，在 2014 年後在利比亞發展的內戰中支持東部指揮官哈利法哈夫塔爾，但開羅越來越多地支持聯合國領導的政治努力統一國家。
週六出席開幕式的穆罕默德·門菲作為利比亞三人總統委員會主席參與了這一進程。
埃及還與土耳其在天然氣豐富的東地中海地區的海上權利問題上經歷了緊張局勢，土耳其支持哈夫塔爾在利比亞的西方競爭對手。然而，開羅和安卡拉今年採取了謹慎的措施來修復關係。
Egypt’s Sisi opens naval base close to border with Libya
Naval forces performed exercises that included the firing of rockets, parachute jumps and an amphibious landing as Sisi and his guests looked on from the bridge of one of the Mistrals.
By REUTERS
JULY 3, 2021 23:22
EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT Abdel Fattah al-Sisi attends a ceremony in Ismailia, Egypt, in 2019
(photo credit: AMR ABDALLAH DALSH / REUTERS)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi inaugurated a naval base on Saturday 135 km from the border with Libya, flanked by close ally Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan and Libya's unity president.
Egypt says the July 3 base will help it protect strategic and economic interests as well as helping guard against irregular migration as it works to boost its naval presence on the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.
At the inauguration, two Mistral helicopter carriers acquired from France were on display alongside a German-made submarine and two recently delivered FREMM-class Italian frigates.
Naval forces performed exercises that included the firing of rockets, parachute jumps and an amphibious landing as Sisi and his guests looked on from the bridge of one of the Mistrals.
The July 3 base, whose name marks the day in 2013 when Sisi led the overthrow of Muslim Brotherhood president Mohamed Morsi in 2013, is spread over more than 10 sq km and has a 1,000-meter naval quay with a water depth of 14 meters. It also has quays for commercial shipping.
The eastern border has been a key security concern for Egypt as Libya slid into turmoil after 2011, though it has beefed up its presence in the area.
Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, where Sheikh Mohammed is de facto ruler, backed the eastern-based commander Khalifa Haftar in the civil conflict that developed in Libya after 2014, but Cairo has increasingly thrown its support behind a United Nations-led political effort to reunify the country.
Mohamed al-Menfi, who attended the opening on Saturday, is part of that process as head of Libya's three-man presidential council.
Egypt has also experienced tensions with Turkey — which backed Haftar's western rivals in Libya — over maritime rights in the gas-rich eastern Mediterranean. However, Cairo and Ankara have taken cautious steps this year to mend relations.
亞伯拉罕協議如何從根本上改變以色列的政治？
國家事務：連接從阿布扎比到馬加爾的相關點
作者：HERB KEINON
2021 年 7 月 3 日 14:33

本週早些時候，外交部長亞伊爾·拉皮德在阿布扎比會見了阿拉伯聯合酋長國外交部長謝赫·阿卜杜拉·本·扎耶德·阿勒納哈揚。
（圖片來源：WAM/REUTERS）
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“從根本上說，阿聯酋和以色列決定在 2020 年簽署具有歷史意義的亞伯拉罕協議時採取不同的做法，”外交部長亞伊爾·拉皮德和他的酋長國同行謝赫·阿卜杜拉·本·扎耶德·阿勒納哈揚週四在阿布扎比報紙《國家報》上寫道。 .
他們寫道：“隨著阿聯酋和以色列之間建立外交關係，我們兩國著手為我們地區確定一種新的範式……”。“雖然亞伯拉罕協議是我們地區的第一個此類協議，但它們代表了一個我們認為必須變得更加普遍的未來：一個將分歧放在一邊以支持對話的未來。”
不是每天都有以色列和阿拉伯外交部長一起寫專欄，它為拉皮德對阿拉伯聯合酋長國為期兩天的訪問——以色列部長的首次正式訪問——提供了一個合適的結論。以色列駐阿布扎比大使館及其駐迪拜領事館落成。
雖然有些人在閱讀外長關於亞伯拉罕協議是該地區首創的言論時可能會猜測下一個阿拉伯國家可能會跟隨阿聯酋、巴林、摩洛哥和蘇丹的步伐，並與以色列實現關係正常化，協議的漣漪已經可以在離家更近的地方感受到——在以色列國內。
就在秋季簽署亞伯拉罕協議，開啟以色列與阿拉伯世界關係的範式轉變之際，當時的總理本傑明·內塔尼亞胡和曼蘇爾·阿巴斯之間的提議是否巧合，然後是聯合名單？
這些提議隨後導致了以色列政治的範式轉變，阿巴斯脫離了四個阿拉伯政黨的聯合名單，並與他自己的 Ra'am（阿拉伯聯合名單）派系獨立運作，並傳達了可以聯合起來的信息與猶太復國主義政府——甚至是右翼猶太復國主義政府——如果這促進了以色列和阿拉伯的利益。
這種轉變是雙向的：內塔尼亞胡和利庫德集團願意與阿拉伯政黨合作，長期以來被右翼視為以色列議會中名副其實的第五縱隊；一個願意與建立定居點的右翼總理打交道的阿拉伯政黨繼續在加沙周圍實施封鎖，12 年來在與巴勒斯坦人的外交戰線上沒有取得任何進展。
一旦內塔尼亞胡和利庫德集團越過盧比孔河並表現出與阿巴斯進行政治合作的意願，這為以色列議會中的其他政黨也這樣做鋪平了道路。這最終導致了目前擁有 61 個席位的聯盟的形成，該聯盟包括並依賴於阿巴斯和拉姆的四個席位。
這恰恰證明了 1988 年的舊競選口號“只有利庫德集團可以”背後的真相——儘管不是利庫德集團公關人員所想的那樣。他們認為，只有利庫德集團才能提供“個人安全、真正的和平、自由市場和社會正義”，就像那年令人難忘的競選廣告。
相反，只有利庫德集團的梅納赫姆貝京可以與埃及簽署和平協議，其中包括從西奈半島完全撤出，因為如果工黨的西蒙佩雷斯提出這個想法，貝京和右翼就會強烈反對它。
同樣，只有利庫德集團的阿里爾·沙龍可以提議、推動和實施從加沙地帶的全面撤軍，因為如果佩雷斯和工黨提出同樣的想法，他們就會被沙龍和利庫德集團粉碎。
同樣，只有在內塔尼亞胡和利庫德集團合法化並與阿拉伯政黨進行猶太政治合作之後，Yesh Atid 領導人 Yair Lapid 可以與 Abbas 進行聯盟談判，而 Yamina 領導人 Naftali Bennett 可以加入與 Ra'am 的聯盟。將以色列視為猶太人的民族家園。
ABBAS 也需要從某個地方獲得合法性，因為他願意與內塔尼亞胡接觸，然後進入由右翼政治家貝內特領導的政府。儘管他設法勉強通過選舉門檻並以四個席位進入以色列議會，但阿巴斯的和解方式和他與右翼接觸的哲學——儘管巴勒斯坦問題遠未得到解決——並沒有讓他在阿拉伯國家中廣受歡迎。街道。
人們相信他和他所在政黨的未來在很大程度上取決於現任政府的存亡，因為如果政府現在垮台，明天舉行選舉，拉姆很可能會加入亞米納、新希望和梅雷茨的行列。可能只是為了重返下屆以色列議會而奮鬥的政黨。
這就是亞伯拉罕協議發揮作用的地方，也是阿巴斯能夠為他的步驟獲得合法性的地方。
如果阿拉伯聯合酋長國不僅可以與以色列，而且可以與右翼內塔尼亞胡談判並最終簽署協議，因為他們意識到這樣做是在促進他們國家的利益，那麼為什麼以色列不能——阿拉伯政黨與以色列政府合作甚至加入，即使是一個右翼總理的政府，如果這樣做可以促進以色列阿拉伯人的利益？
如果阿聯酋可以在巴勒斯坦問題尚未解決的情況下與以色列實現關係正常化，因為這將有助於它反擊伊朗的霸權區域設計，使其受益於以色列的技術、農業和情報實力，以及使其能夠從美國購買 F35，那麼如果這對以色列-阿拉伯社區有利，為什麼阿拉伯政黨與以色列右翼政府打交道同樣不合適呢？
阿巴斯意識到，坐在桌子周圍的人會吃飽，如果以色列-阿拉伯社區想要公平地分享該國的資源——而不僅僅是不時從桌子上扔掉一些碎片——它需要圍繞櫃桌。它必須願意坐在那張桌子旁，即使它不喜歡廚師為其他人提供的一切。
例如，Abbas 和 Ra'am 肯定會在阿拉伯街頭受到批評，因為他們繼續坐在一個本週與定居點領導人達成妥協的政府中，即不會拆除 Evyatar 的非法前哨，而是變成一支軍隊營地等待調查它是巴勒斯坦私人土地還是國有土地，屆時它可能成為猶太教的所在地。
同樣，如果同意讓聯盟將家庭團聚法再延長一年，禁止 35 歲以下的巴勒斯坦男性和 25 歲以下的女性與他們的以色列配偶住在裡面的妥協，Ra'am 肯定會採取行動。綠線。
在這兩種情況下，都會詢問該黨如何向採取此類措施的政府伸出援手。
在這裡，阿巴斯也可以從阿拉伯聯合酋長國和其他亞伯拉罕協議國家獲得掩護，儘管梅在加沙地帶進行了小型戰爭，但這些國家仍繼續與以色列實現正常化。
在以色列與哈馬斯戰鬥僅一個月後，拉皮德前往阿聯酋——或者阿布扎比歡迎他——並不是一件小事。此外，阿聯酋東道主在訪問期間明確表示，加沙沖突不會影響蓬勃發展的關係。為什麼不？因為這些關係對阿聯酋有利。
因此，如果阿聯酋不讓一場為期 11 天的戰爭——在這場戰爭中 256 名巴勒斯坦人被殺，加沙地帶被以色列火力摧毀——破壞了它與這個猶太國家的關係，那麼 Ra'am 是否需要因為政府對 Evyatar 或家庭團聚法的妥協？
Lapid 和 bin Zayed 在寫到阿聯酋與以色列關係的轉型潛力時，考慮到了更大的區域發展，希望以色列與阿聯酋之間關係的成功將影響該地區的態度。
然而，似乎最強烈地感受到這種潛力的地方不是在沙特阿拉伯或巴基斯坦，而是在阿巴斯的家鄉馬加爾和內蓋夫的貝都因人（拉姆的政治支持的基石）等地方。從該黨加入聯盟中受益最大，因為政府已承諾承認內蓋夫三個未被承認的貝都因人村莊。
從表面上看，拉皮德本週對阿布扎比的訪問和聯盟的發展似乎是孤立進行的。但他們沒有。有一條線將這兩個遙遠的點連接起來：亞伯拉罕協議和拉姆在這個聯盟中的成員身份。
How did the Abraham Accords fundamentally shift Israel's politics?
NATIONAL AFFAIRS: Connecting the related dots from Abu Dhabi to Maghar
By HERB KEINON
JULY 3, 2021 14:33
FOREIGN MINISTER Yair Lapid meets with United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan in Abu Dhabi earlier this week.
(photo credit: WAM/REUTERS)
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“Fundamentally, the UAE and Israel decided to do things differently with the signing of the historic Abraham Accords in 2020,” Foreign Minister Yair Lapid and his Emirate counterpart, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, wrote on Thursday in the Abu Dhabi newspaper The National.
“With the establishment of diplomatic relations between the UAE and Israel, our two countries set out to determine a new paradigm for our region…,” they wrote. “While the Abraham Accords were the first of their kind in our region, they represent a future that we believe must become more commonplace: one in which differences are set aside in favor of dialogue.”
It’s not every day that an Israeli and an Arab foreign minister pen an op-ed together, and it served as a suiting conclusion to Lapid’s two-day visit to the United Arab Emirates – the first official visit by an Israeli minister – during which he inaugurated Israel’s embassy in Abu Dhabi, and its consulate in Dubai.
While some reading the foreign ministers’ words about the Abraham Accords being the first of its kind in the region may speculate about which Arab country may be next to follow the lead of the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan and normalize ties with Israel, the ripples from the accords can already be felt much closer to home – within Israel itself.
Is it a coincidence that just as the Abraham Accords were signed in the fall, ushering in a paradigmatic shift in Israel’s relations with the Arab world, overtures were being made between then-prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Mansour Abbas, then of the Joint List?
Those overtures then led to a paradigmatic shift in Israeli politics, with Abbas breaking away from the Joint List of four Arab parties and running independently with his own Ra’am (United Arab List) faction, with a message that it is okay to join forces with a Zionist government – even a right-wing Zionist government – if this promotes Israeli-Arab interests.
This shift went in both directions: Netanyahu and the Likud willing to cooperate with an Arab party, long viewed on the Right as a veritable fifth column in the Knesset; and an Arab party willing to deal with a right-wing prime minister who built in the settlements, continues to enforce a blockade around Gaza and in 12 years made no progress on the diplomatic front with the Palestinians.
Once Netanyahu and the Likud crossed the Rubicon and showed a willingness to cooperate politically with Abbas, that paved the way for other parties in the Knesset to do the same. This eventually led to the formation of the current 61-seat coalition, which includes, and depends for its survival, on Abbas and Ra’am’s four seats.
This just proves the truth behind that old 1988 campaign slogan, “only the Likud can” – though not in the way the Likud publicists had in mind. They had in mind that only the Likud, as the memorable campaign jingle went that year, could provide “personal security, real peace, a free market and social justice.”
Instead, only the Likud’s Menachem Begin could have signed a peace deal with Egypt that included a complete and total withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, because had Labor’s Shimon Peres put that idea on the table, Begin and the Right would have worked feverishly against it.
Likewise, only Ariel Sharon of the Likud could have proposed, promoted and implemented a full withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, because had Peres and Labor proposed the same idea they would have been pulverized by Sharon and the Likud.
By the same token, Yesh Atid head Yair Lapid could conduct coalition negotiations with Abbas, and Yamina leader Naftali Bennett could join a coalition with Ra’am, only after Netanyahu and the Likud legitimized and made kosher political cooperation with an Arab party that does not view Israel as the national homeland of the Jewish people.
ABBAS, TOO, needed to gain legitimacy from somewhere for his willingness to engage with Netanyahu, and then to enter into a government led by a right-wing politician, Bennett. Though he managed to squeak just past the electoral threshold and into the Knesset with four seats, Abbas’s conciliatory approach and his philosophy of engagement with the Right – even though the Palestinian issue remains far from being resolved – has not brought him widespread popularity on the Arab street.
His future, and that of his party, is believed to be very much dependent on the survival of the current government, for if the government were to fall now and elections called tomorrow, Ra’am would likely join Yamina, New Hope and Meretz as parties that may struggle just to make it back into the next Knesset.
And this is where the Abraham Accords come into play, and where Abbas was able to derive legitimacy for his steps.
If the United Arab Emirates could negotiate and eventually sign a deal not only with Israel, but with the right-wing Netanyahu, because of a realization that by so doing they are advancing the interests of their country, then why can’t an Israeli-Arab party cooperate with and even join an Israeli government, even one with a right-wing prime minister, if by so doing it can advance the interests of Israeli-Arabs?
If it is okay for the UAE, even though the Palestinian issue has not been resolved, to normalize ties with Israel because this will help it push back against Iran’s hegemonic regional designs, allow it to benefit from Israel’s technological, agricultural and intelligence prowess, and enable it to buy F35s from the US, then why is it equally not okay for an Arab party to deal with a right-wing Israeli government if this benefits the Israeli-Arab community.
Abbas realized that he who sits around the table, gets fed, and that if the Israeli-Arab community wants to get a fair share of the country’s resources – and not just thrown some scraps from the table from time to time – it needs to be around the cabinet table. And it must be willing to sit at that table even if it doesn’t like everything that the cook is dishing out for others.
For instance, Abbas and Ra’am will certainly come under criticism on the Arab street for continuing to sit in a government that this week reached a compromise with settlement leaders whereby the illegal outpost of Evyatar would not be demolished, but rather turned into an army encampment pending a survey of whether it is private Palestinian or state land, at which time it might become the site of a yeshiva.
Likewise, Ra’am will surely take heat if agrees to a compromise that will allow the coalition to extend by another year the Family Reunification Law preventing Palestinian males under the age of 35 and females under the age of 25 from living with their Israeli spouses inside the Green Line.
In both cases, the party will be asked how it could lend its hand to a government that carries out such measures.
Here, too, Abbas can gain cover from the United Arab Emirates and the other Abraham Accords countries that have carried on with their normalization with Israel despite May’s mini-war in Gaza.
It is no small thing that Lapid went to the UAE – or that Abu Dhabi welcomed him – just a month after Israel fought Hamas. Moreover, the Emirati hosts made it clear throughout the visit that the Gaza conflict was not going to impact the burgeoning ties. Why not? Because those ties are good for the UAE.
So if the UAE is not going to let an 11-day war – during which 256 Palestinians were killed and the Gaza Strip devastated by Israeli firepower – torpedo its relations with the Jewish state, then does Ra’am need to bolt the coalition because of the government’s compromises over Evyatar or the Family Reunification Law?
Lapid and bin Zayed, when they wrote of the transformational potential of UAE-Israel ties, had in mind greater regional developments, hoping that the success in the ties between Israel and the UAE will impact attitudes around the region.
Where that potential seems to have been felt most strongly, however, was not in Saudi Arabia or Pakistan, but rather in places like Abbas’s home town of Maghar and among the Bedouin in the Negev – the bedrock of Ra’am’s political support – who stand to benefit the most from the party’s joining the coalition, since the government has pledged to recognize three unrecognized Bedouin villages in the Negev.
On the surface, Lapid’s visit to Abu Dhabi and coalition developments this week seem to have taken place in isolation. But they did not. There is a line that connects those two distant dots: The Abraham Accords and Ra’am’s membership in this coalition.
內塔尼亞胡聲稱貝內特是極右翼 OAN 新聞的“左翼傀儡”
內塔尼亞胡還聲稱，阿以拉姆黨是巴勒斯坦恐怖組織哈馬斯的一個分支。
通過耶路撒冷郵報STAFF
2021 年 7 月 3 日 20:09
YAIR NETANYAHU 在最近的法庭聽證會上。
（照片來源：AVSHALOM SHOSHANI）
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前總理兼現任反對派領導人本傑明·內塔尼亞胡的兒子亞伊爾週六接受了美國一個新聞網（OAN）的採訪，他在採訪中向美國觀眾講述了以色列的政治局勢。
在接受極右翼親特朗普媒體採訪時，內塔尼亞胡表示，儘管他的父親在 2021 年 3 月的選舉中以利庫德集團黨首的身份贏得了議會的 30 個席位，但貝內特卻成為了中左翼政黨的“左翼傀儡”並與他們一起組成聯合政府。
內塔尼亞胡還聲稱，阿以拉姆黨是巴勒斯坦恐怖組織哈馬斯的一個分支。
“比[貝內特加入左翼]更糟糕的是，在以色列，他們第一次在政府中包括了一個穆斯林阿拉伯政黨，即以色列伊斯蘭兄弟會。它支持恐怖主義……在監獄裡探望恐怖分子“謀殺了以色列兒童並稱他們為英雄。[他們]公開呼籲摧毀以色列並建立一個伊斯蘭教的巴勒斯坦國家。”
“他們對本屆政府的任何決定擁有否決權，可以隨時解散。”
內塔尼亞胡還聲稱，貝內特在未來的以色列大選中不太可能通過選舉門檻，而貝內特領導的新政府正試圖實施一項“極權主義法”，以阻止其父親再次成為總理。
內塔尼亞胡攻擊以色列媒體，進一步聲稱它“是為了得到他的父親”。
Yair Netanyahu claims Bennett is 'leftist puppet' to far-right OAN news
Netanyahu also claimed that the Arab-Israeli Ra'am Party is a branch of the Palestinian terrorist organization Hamas.
By JERUSALEM POST STAFF
JULY 3, 2021 20:09

YAIR NETANYAHU at a recent court hearing.
(photo credit: AVSHALOM SHOSHANI)
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Former Prime Minister and current opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu's son Yair gave an interview to the One America News (OAN) network on Saturday in which he spoke about the political situation in Israel to an American audience.
During the interview with the far-right pro-Trump outlet, Netanyahu said that despite his father winning 30 seats in the Knesset as head of the Likud Party in the March 2021 election, Bennett became a 'leftist puppet' by working center-left parties and joining with them in a coalition government.
Netanyahu also claimed that the Arab-Israeli Ra'am Party is a branch of the Palestinian terrorist organization Hamas.
"What is even worse than [Bennett joining the left] is that is for the first time in Israel, they included in the government a Muslim Arab party that is the Islamic Brotherhood of Israel. It supports terrorism…visits terrorists in jail who murdered Israeli children and calls them heroes. [They have] openly called for the destruction of Israel and for creating a Sharia Islamic country of Palestine."
"They have a veto on any decision in this government and can dissolve it at any moment."
Netanyahu also claimed that Bennett is not likely to pass the electoral threshold in a future Israeli election, and that the new government led by Bennett is trying to implement a "totalitarian law" that would prevent his father from becoming prime minister again.
Attacking the Israeli media, Netanyahu further claimed that it is 'out to get his father.'
"All we have are two channels that are the equivalent of MSNBC and CNN, only 10 times more radical… and really it looks now with the formation of the new government like the North Korean television reports on their government. It is absolutely, you know, they were killing my dad all these years and really doing shameful things to him and all conservative voters in Israel…mocking conservative voters in Israel."
Yair Netanyahu is a controversial figure in Israel, having been sued multiple times by politicians and journalists for defamation against them.
El Al與阿提哈德簽署代碼共享協議
該協議建立在阿聯酋和以色列簽署亞伯拉罕協議之後，航空公司於 2020 年簽署的諒解備忘錄 (MOU)。
由ZEV 存根
2021 年 7 月 3 日 18:51

載有以色列和美國代表的 El Al 客機週日在阿布扎比國際機場降